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Flint Construction Co. v. Hall12/30/2004
s stated reasons for Hall's discharge shifted and changed that all of the reasons Flint gave for Hall's discharge were pretextual. See Motion Indus., Inc. v. Pate, 678 So. 2d 724 (Ala. 1996) (employee presented sufficient evidence of pretext where record reflected discrepancies between supervisor's trial testimony and deposition testimony); Coastal Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 669 So. 2d 803 (Ala. 1995) (employee presented sufficient evidence of pretext where employer changed its stated reason for discharging employee and where employer's records did not support alleged reason for discharge); Culbreth, 599 So. 2d at 1123 (employee presented sufficient evidence of pretext where employer waited to inform employee of reason for discharge until after those who made decision to discharge had a private conference). See also Waldrip Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Wallace, 758 So. 2d 1110 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (evidence showed discrepancies between employer's deposition testimony and its trial testimony); Etheredge v. Flowers, 766 So. 2d 842 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Progress Rail Servs. Corp., 869 So. 2d 459 (Ala. 2003) (employee presented evidence of positive job evaluations during probationary period that created doubt about employer's stated reason for her discharge). We cannot say as a matter of law that the jury could not have concluded that Flint's stated reason for Hall's discharge was pretextual without impermissibly reweighing the evidence. Consequently, Flint was not entitled to a JML, and the trial court properly denied its postjudgment motion on that basis.
We conclude that in light of the foregoing, Flint was not entitled to a JML. As we stated in Aldridge:
"An employer's stated basis for a discharge is sufficient as a matter of law when the underlying facts surrounding the stated basis for the discharge are undisputed and there is no substantial evidence indicating (a) that the stated basis has been applied in a discriminatory manner to employees who have filed workers' compensation claims, (b) that the stated basis conflicts with express company policy on grounds for discharge, or (c) that the employer has disavowed the stated reason or has otherwise acknowledged its pretextual status."
854 So. 2d at 568. First, in this case, unlike in Aldridge, the underlying facts surrounding the stated basis for Hall's discharge are disputed. For example, whether there was a lack of work, whether any of the decision-makers knew about Hall's injury and his worker's compensation claim and when that person knew it, and whether Hall's absences were unexcused or unexplained were all disputed facts. Further, here, unlike in Aldridge, Flint's stated reasons changed with the passage of time. Even if we were to conclude that the facts underlying Flint's stated reason for discharging Hall were undisputed, a JML is not appropriate where, as here, the employer subsequently contradicts the reason it initially gave for the discharge, thereby at least implicitly disavowing it or by such action acknowledging its pretextual status, giving rise to a jury question as to the credibility of the employer's evidence as to the reason for the employee's discharge.
IV. Damages
Having concluded that Flint was not entitled to a JML, we turn to its arguments that the damages awarded by the jury were improper.
A. Mitigation of Compensatory Damages
The jury awarded Hall $400,000 in compensatory damages. Flint's only challenge to this award is an argument that the trial court erred in failing to find that Hall did not mitigate his damages. After the close of all the evidence, Flint moved for a JML on the ground that Hall "had an opportunity to c
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