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Flint Construction Co. v. Hall12/30/2004
en Hall at the casino but that she had not spoken with anyone else at Flint about it. Jacob also stated that no one at Flint said anything to her in June 1997 about having seen Hall at the casino. On cross- examination, Good, Fuller, and James Eaves each admitted that he had not mentioned gambling when he gave his pretrial deposition and was asked to state the reasons for Hall's discharge. Jacob said that sometime after she left Flint's employ in June 1998, either Terry Fuller or one of Flint's lawyers telephoned her and asked her the exact date she had seen Hall at the casino in Philadelphia. She said she had to check her credit-card bill before she was able to recall the date.
Flint moved for a JML at the close of Hall's evidence and again at the close of all the evidence. The trial court granted the motion at the close of Hall's evidence only as to his fraud claims and denied the motion as to the retaliatory-discharge claim at the close of all the evidence. Only the retaliatory-discharge claim was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hall, awarding him $400,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. Flint then filed a postjudgment motion for a JML or a new trial, which, as previously noted, was denied by operation of law.
II. Jurisdiction
We first address Flint's renewal of its argument that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear Hall's retaliatory-discharge claim because, it argues, that claim should have been brought in Georgia. Section 6-5-430, Ala. Code 1975, gives Alabama courts jurisdiction over claims arising under the laws of another state. Section 25-5-35, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, allows the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act to apply to work-related injuries that occur outside Alabama, so long as the law of the other state is not applicable and when certain facts exist. As previously noted, Flint had settled two previous worker's compensation claims brought by Hall as well as the claim in the instant case, with a recitation in each agreement, "[The parties] agree and represent unto the Court ... hat they are subject to the provisions of the [Workers'] Compensation Statute of Alabama, as amended." Flint is therefore estopped under Alabama law from asserting different facts to prevent the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act from applying. See Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., supra, 775 So. 2d at 807-08. Flint is likewise estopped from asserting different facts to argue that Georgia law, rather than Alabama law, should apply to this case. Our resolution of these issues in Hall's favor makes it unnecessary for us to address Flint's argument that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the three workers' compensation settlement petitions.
III. Retaliatory Discharge
As a general rule in Alabama, an employment contract for an indefinite period is terminable at will by either party, with or without cause or justification. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987). The Legislature carved out an exception to that general rule, however, with regard to a discharge of an employee in the aftermath of the filing of a workers' compensation claim. Section 25- 5-11.1 provides:
"No employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits under this chapter ...."
We now turn to Flint's argument that Hall did not prove the elements of a retaliatory discharge.
A. Standard of Review
This Court applies the same standard
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