 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Flint Construction Co. v. Hall12/30/2004
of review to a ruling on a motion for a JML as the trial court used in initially deciding the motion. This standard is "materially indistinguishable from the standard by which we review a summary judgment." Hathcock v. Wood, 815 So. 2d 502, 506 (Ala. 2001). We must decide whether substantial evidence was presented to the jury, which, when viewed in the light most favorable to Hall, would warrant a jury verdict in his favor. If so, the trial court did not err in not granting Flint's motions for a JML. City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So. 2d 755 (Ala. 2002). "Substantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair- minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). Furthermore, "we review the record as of the time the motion for a JML was renewed at the close of all the evidence." Alabama Power Co. v. Aldridge, 854 So. 2d 554, 561 (Ala. 2002).
B. Elements of a Prima Facie Case
In Aldridge, we clarified the rule that " plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the workers' compensation claim and the subsequent discharge in order to establish a prima facie case." 854 So. 2d at 563. We then reiterated the elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge:
"In order for an employee to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge the employee must show: 1) an employment relationship, 2) an on-the-job injury , 3) knowledge on the part of the employer of the on-the-job injury, and 4) subsequent termination of employment based solely upon the employee's on-the-job injury and the filing of a workers' compensation claim."
854 So. 2d at 563.
It is undisputed that Hall proved the first two elements. He was employed by Flint, and he injured his back at work. However, Flint argues that its decision-makers were not aware that Hall had been injured or that he had filed a workers' compensation claim. Flint also argues that it was entitled to a JML because, it argues, Hall did not prove that he was discharged solely because he filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, relying on that portion of Aldridge in which we stated that "where a conclusive determination can be made that retaliation is not the sole basis for the discharge a judgment as a matter of law is appropriate." 854 So. 2d at 568. We address the evidence presented of those two elements in succeeding subsections.
1. Whether Hall Offered Substantial Evidence of "Knowledge on the Part of the Employer of the On-the-Job Injury ."
Flint relies on the testimony of Good, Fuller, and James Eaves (hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as "the decision- makers") in arguing that they did not know Hall had injured his back while working in Bastrop and that, therefore, Hall has not established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge. The decision-makers all testified that although they knew that Hall's knee problems were the result of work-related injuries, they knew nothing about any injury to his back when they made the decision to discharge him. Hall maintains, however, that the facts are disputed as to whether the decision-makers knew about the injury to his back, relying upon his testimony at trial describing in detail his telephone conversations with Fuller and James Eaves well before June 4 during which information concerning his back injury was conveyed. Hall also argues that circumstantial evidence supports an inference that the decision-makers learned of his injury from Nelson Grams, the safety director. According to testimony presented to the
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Alabama Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|