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Webb Wheel Products12/30/2004 t when Hanvey acknowledged that he would have been laid off, and in light of a ratio that would not be constitutionally permissible if such an amount had been awarded as punitive damages separate from the lost wages and benefits claim of 13 days, we conclude that the award of punitive damages in the amount of $400,000 should have been set aside, and that the trial court erred in denying that aspect of Webb Wheel's postjudgment motion. Therefore, we reverse that aspect of the judgment awarding Hanvey $400,000 in punitive damages.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment insofar as it holds Webb Wheel liable to Hanvey because it discharged him solely because he filed a workers' compensation claim. We also affirm the judgment insofar as it awarded compensatory damages of $80,000. We reverse the judgment insofar as it awarded punitive damages. We remand the case for proceedings or the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Houston and Harwood, JJ., concur.
Johnstone, J., concurs in part and concurs in the rationale in part.
See, Brown, and Woodall, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
Nabers, C.J., and Stuart, J., dissent.
JOHNSTONE, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the rationale in part).
But for two exceptions, I concur in the scholarly main opinion. The first exception is that, since Webb Wheel has never argued that it was not liable for damages suffered after November 1, 2000, I do not concur in the conclusions of the main opinion predicated on the hypothesis "Had Webb Wheel argued that it was not liable for damages after November 1."
The second exception is that I do not agree with the punitive damage analysis. I think that the evidence supports a reasonable inference of willfulness by Webb Wheel in its commission of its tort, a reasonable inference of a cover-up by Webb Wheel in its treatment of the plaintiff during and after the commission of the tort, and a reasonable inference of false testimony by Webb Wheel at trial. Therefore, I think the evidence supports a substantial punitive damage award, although not necessarily the $400,000 assessed by the jury and imposed by the judgment of the trial court.
On the other hand, a practical consideration requires that I concur not only in the judgment affirming the compensatory award but also in the judgment invalidating and reversing the punitive damage award. Unless at least a majority of this Court agrees to this judgment, this Court likely will not preserve any of the relief granted the plaintiff by the trial court and likely will not even maintain the resolution of the liability issue in the plaintiff's favor. The plaintiff deserves some relief; and the bench, bar, and people of this State need the splendid explanation of the law on the liability issue contained in the main opinion. Therefore, I concur in the judgment as stated in the main opinion and in the rationale to the extent specified in this special writing.
SEE, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I dissent from Part II of the main opinion, which holds that Webb Wheel was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. I believe that the plaintiff, Joshua Hanvey, was not entitled to recover under the retaliatory-discharge statute, which requires that he establish that he was discharged "solely because ha instituted or maintained action against [Webb Wheel] to recover workers' compensation benefits." See Ala. Code 1975, * 25-5-11.1. Hanvey failed even to present substantial evidence that he was in fact fired, rather than laid off pursuant
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