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Lifestar Response of Alabama12/3/2004
iveness at the trial court, but it seeks to benefit from the fact that that issue "was briefed and argued by Care at the hearing." (Lifestar's brief, p. 46.) The argument Care "briefed" and presented in its motion to set aside the judgment, however, was that, because the purpose of punitive damages is to deter wrongful conduct and to punish those responsible for wrongful conduct, it was deserving of no such punishment because it was not the entity that provided the medical treatment to Mr. Lemuel. Further, it asserted:
"Care of Alabama is informed by the actual transporter, Lifestar[,] that the condition from which Mr. Lemuel ultimately died was such that no reasonably prudent emergency transport team and/or member would have been expected to thwart. In other words, it is believed that the unfortunate consequence of Mr. Lemuel's condition was going to be death no matter the care offered by the ambulance team. Stated another way, certainly the actions of this defendant are not causally related to Mr. Lemuel's death since it had no connection therewith, but in addition it would appear that Lifestar's actions were also not culpable. Facts relating to these issues have not been able to be developed through discovery and presented to the Court and would give grounds to another 'meritorious defense' under Kirtland [v. Fort Morgan Authority Sewer Service, Inc., 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988)]."
Lifestar argues to this Court that there was no medical evidence presented to Judge Price at the damages hearing to "substantiate the cause of death as being a breach of the standard of care by the medics providing service at the scene and in route to the hospital." (Lifestar's brief, p. 47.) Given the testimony of Dallas Johnson at the damages hearing, we cannot agree with that contention.
This Court and the Legislature have established a constitutionally appropriate system for reviewing a contention that a punitive-damages award is excessive. See Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989); and § 6-11-23(b), Ala. Code 1975. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has established various "guideposts" and considerations for assessing whether punitive damages are excessive, in a series of cases including, most notably, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). Lifestar would have been entitled to a Hammond-Green Oil hearing if it had properly requested one, but a trial judge does not err in not conducting a hearing on punitive damages if no such hearing is requested. Phillips, 828 So. 2d at 279. Lifestar says in its brief that " dmittedly, no Hammond-Green Oil hearing was held," but goes on to argue that " ithout getting into the Hammond-Green Oil, BMW, and § 6-11-23(b), Code of Alabama, requirements," this Court should, on its own initiative, conduct an independent review of the punitive damages awarded in this case. A Hammond-Green Oil hearing was available to Care and Lifestar; they simply made no effort to present any evidence or argument relating to the factors and criteria developed by caselaw for reviewing punitive damages, other than as incidentally presented in connection with the Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguments noted above. Likewise, no separate argument was presented with respect to any of the BMW "guideposts." In now asserting that " his Court is charged with the duty of conducting its own review of punitive damages," Lifestar cites only Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 532 (Ala. 1997). That case stands for the proposition that we will conduct our own review of a punitive-damages award if the issue of excessiveness has been properly presented
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