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Lifestar Response of Alabama12/3/2004
aused him damage. When they received the complaint, it should have been apparent to the on-site representatives of Stouffer Hotel Management that [the plaintiff] had stated claims for damages against the entity or entities doing business under the trade name 'Stouffer Riverview Plaza Hotel,' based on the alleged wrongful acts of the hotel's manager. The hotel's manager was an employee of Stouffer Hotel Management. This Court in Hughes stated that 'one doing business in a trade name has fair notice that a complaint alleging a cause of action arising, out of his business may lead to personal liability.' 601 So. 2d at 471. The record indicates that answers had been filed in numerous other actions (tort actions, workers' compensation actions, and garnishment actions) against 'Stouffer Riverview Plaza Hotel' and that those actions were resolved by Stouffer Hotel Management. We find unpersuasive CTF's argument that its predecessor could not reasonably have known that it had been sued."
719 So. 2d at 209.
We find similarly unpersuasive Lifestar's argument that it could not reasonably have known that it had been sued. We do not agree with its contention in its brief that " here was simply nothing about the Complaint or Summons filed by Lemuel which would put Lifestar on notice it was the intended defendant." (Lifestar's brief, p. 44.) Lifestar does not contend that Robertson was not a proper agent for service of process on it, and Rule 4(c)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., as it read in 2003, allowed, among alternative means for service upon a corporation, service upon "an agent of the corporation." We cannot reject Judge Price's finding, paralleling that in Ex parte CTF, that "it should have been apparent to the on-site representatives of 'Lifestar' that the Plaintiff stated a claim for damages against the entity doing business under the name 'Care Ambulance Service' based on the alleged wrongful acts of the employees of 'Lifestar.'" See 719 So. 2d at 209. Even a cursory reading of the complaint would have revealed that the underlying incident involved employees of Lifestar. Lifestar had purchased the corporate name "Care Ambulance Service of Alabama, Inc." from Care, and Care was barred from using that name for any ambulance operations in Alabama; Lifestar did business both as "Care Ambulance Service" and "Care Ambulance." Over the course of several years preceding the Lemuel action, legal papers directed to "Care Ambulance Service of Alabama, Inc." and "Care Ambulance Service" had been accepted for service by Lifestar personnel, including Robertson, at the South Perry Street address. Another action naming "Care Ambulance Service of Alabama, Inc." as the defendant had been served on Vanessa Hill, and Lifestar had filed an answer in the case acknowledging that it did business as "Care Ambulance Service" and explaining that it was "incorrectly designated as Care Ambulance Service of Alabama, Inc." Accordingly, we find no error in Judge Price's decision to allow the default judgment to be amended to designate Lifestar as the entity against whom it operated.
Lifestar argues that the holdings of Ex parte Pate, 673 So. 2d 427 (Ala. 1995), and Cofield v. McDonald's Corp., 514 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 1987), support its position. Those cases, however, are distinguishable. The title of the complaint in Cofield listed McDonald's Corporation as "the only entity named as a defendant," 514 So. 2d at 954, and the plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed it from the action. "Rule 10(a), [Ala.] R. Civ. P., requires that a complaint include the names of all parties in the title of the action." 514 So. 2d at 953-54. Although it is not clear from the opinion just how two other corporations might have been mentioned in the trial court
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