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Lifestar Response of Alabama12/3/2004
record, the plaintiff argued that they should have been recognized as defendants "as evidenced by the case action summary sheet." 514 So. 2d at 953. This Court held that although the plaintiff might have intended an action against the other two entities, "he did not properly identify them in his complaint." 514 So. 2d at 954. Accordingly, this Court upheld the order of the trial court dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
In Pate, the plaintiff, seeking workers' compensation benefits, sued three specifically identified business entities, serving them by certified mail addressed in care of Mr. Pate, who was not named as an individual defendant. Subsequently, on the day of trial, the plaintiff amended his complaint to substitute two other corporations for fictitiously named defendants, again serving Pate. After ruling in favor of the plaintiff and holding two of the named corporations liable as his general and special employers, respectively, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff "had presented sufficient evidence to pierce the corporate veil" of the two corporations, so as to hold Pate, their president, personally liable. Pate argued on appeal that "he was never named as a defendant, was never served with a complaint, and was not put on notice before trial of any claim or personal liability against him." 673 So. 2d at 428. This Court held that because "Pate was never named as a defendant in his individual capacity," 673 So. 2d at 429, and appeared at trial only in his representative capacity, the judgment against him was due to be set aside.
Thus, there was no contention in Cofield that the two entities the plaintiff sought to have recognized as defendants had ever been served with any papers that in any way named them, or in any way described conduct involving them, so as to put either of them on notice that it was an entity intended to be sued. Likewise, the title of the action in Pate never included any form of Pate's name, and he was never put on notice of any claim of personal liability.
We turn next to Lifestar's contention that Judge Price erred in not granting its motion to set aside the default judgment. We agree with Lifestar that its motion was timely under Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., because of the filing and pendency of the plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment.
In Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Authority Sewer Service, Inc., 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988), we explained that "when exercising discretionary authority pursuant to Rule 55(c), a trial judge should start with the presumption that cases should be decided on the merits whenever practical." 524 So. 2d at 605. We went on to explain, and hold, as follows:
"The greatest difficulty in deciding whether to grant or to deny a motion to set aside a default judgment arises in those cases falling in the expansive area between the two extremes--one extreme characterized by the presentation of a clearly frivolous defense or no defense at all and by intentional and flagrant abuse of procedural rules, which come together to warrant disposition of the case by default judgment, and the other extreme characterized by inadvertent oversight coupled with an obviously meritorious defense, which come together to warrant disposition by trial. To alleviate the difficulty involved in deciding Rule 55(c) motions and to ensure that justice will be served, clear guidelines need to be established and then implemented by trial courts. Thus, we hold that a trial court's broad discretionary authority under Rule 55(c) should not be exercised without considering the following three factors: 1) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; 2) whether the plaintiff will
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