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Anderson v. Longmont Toyota12/6/2004
essed such an intent in the statutory language it chose to utilize, or the legislative history, or both. In neither do we find the legislature's intent to repeal or modify the ICAO's remedial authority to reopen workers' compensation awards, as it did in the two cases before us.
In summary, we conclude that the General Assembly intended section 8-42-105(4) to weed out wage loss claims subsequent to voluntary or for-cause termination of modified employment that do not involve a worsened condition.
C. Application to this Case
In light of the General Assembly's 1999 debate and the remedial purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act, the ICAO correctly construed section 8-42-105(4) as not barring the worsening condition claims at issue in the two cases before us, even though one of the employees voluntarily left the modified employment and the other was fired for cause. The court of appeals construction of this statutory provision is contrary to the presumption that the General Assembly intended a just and reasonable result and is overly broad in light of the provision's legislative history.
Workers' compensation laws establish the scope and extent of liability. See Larson, supra, §§ 1.02, 1.03. The legislation protects both the employer's interest in minimizing financial risk as well as the injured employee's interest in equitable compensation. As the ICAO found, there is no dispute in these cases that the claimants were physically capable of performing modified employment when they terminated their injury -related employment. Subsequent to termination, Anderson engaged in modified work with another employer. However, a worsened condition rendered him unable to perform the job . Similarly, after he left the modified employment, Krause experienced a worsened condition that required surgery and prevented him from returning to any work. In both situations, because the worsened condition and not the termination of employment caused the wage losses, the ICAO concluded the claimants were entitled to TTD benefits.
In reviewing the administrative agency's interpretation of its own enabling statute, we give considerable weight to the agency's construction of the statute while reviewing it de novo. Davidson, 84 P.3d at 1023. Here, the ICAO decisions are in accord with the legislative history and stated purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act to assure "the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers." § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. (2004).
In its brief to this court, the ICAO observes that " he practical effect of the Court of Appeals decision is that once an employee is injured, he or she may not leave employment with that employer without the risk of forever losing disability benefits if the injury worsens." We agree. The court of appeals construction of the statute would not only deprive these two employees of benefits they are entitled to receive under the act, it would also have the effect of freezing the job market by penalizing employees for seeking to improve their job situation by working for another employer, moving out of town, or shortening their work hours because of familial considerations. The General Assembly did not intend such a result; it was concerned about abuse of the modified employment and injury compensation goals of the act, not with intimidating employees into staying at their present employment.
III.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the court of appeals and uphold the ICAO rulings. We remand these cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICE COATS dissents.
JUSTICE COATS, dissenting.
Unlike the
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