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Anderson v. Longmont Toyota12/6/2004
majority, I do not believe the history of sections 8-42-103(1)(g) and -105(4), C.R.S. (2004), suggests, even remotely, a legislative intent to require the payment of TTD benefits, by former employers, for work-related injuries that only become disabling after the employee has chosen to quit his job. Perhaps even more importantly, however, I do not believe the language of the statute itself admits of any such construction. And while I wholly agree with the court of appeals that these provisions were enacted for the express purpose of overturning our holding in PDM Molding, I do not understand our holding in that case, even if (as now appears to be the case) the legislature was unsuccessful in overturning it, to sanction the majority's action today. Whether one finds the court's policy justification convincing or not, it clearly endorses a view of workers' compensation, as a species of social insurance, that I believe was never intended by the General Assembly.
The single sentence, added in two separate locations in the wake of PDM Molding, is simple enough: "In cases where it is determined that a temporarily disabled employee is responsible for termination of employment, the resulting wage loss shall not be attributable to the on-the-job injury ." ยงยง 8-42-103(1)(g) and -105(4). From its context and timing, and testimony at the hearings, the amendment was clearly designed to address the holding of PDM Molding -- that despite quitting or being fired for cause, an employee was nevertheless entitled to disability benefits, as long as a job -related injury was at least a contributing factor in his termination and consequent loss of wages. See PDM Molding, 898 P.2d at 547. By contrast with our holding, the statute now mandates that if an employee is found responsible for his own termination, the wage loss resulting from that termination cannot be attributed to a prior injury, regardless of any role that injury may have also played.
Notwithstanding the majority's declaration of ambiguity, the words "resulting wage loss," which follow immediately after "termination of employment," can only refer to the loss of wages suffered upon termination "from the employment out of which the injury arises," id., not a subsequent termination from later employment. Whatever the cause of the employee's termination -- a factual matter to be resolved in each case -- the wage loss to which the statute refers is unambiguous. If the employee is responsible for his own termination from the employment out of which his injury arises, his resulting wage loss can no more be attributed to a subsequent worsening of his condition than to his on-the-job injury in the first instance. Despite the contrived reading of the ICAO to the contrary, see maj. op. at 9, the language of the statute simply does not permit an exception for a wage loss that "would have occurred," whether or not the employee voluntarily quit or was at fault. Whether those voting for the amendment envisioned fact scenarios like those before the court today or not, the amendment could not more clearly express a legislative intent that responsibility for one's own termination be dispositive of the cause of his resulting wage loss.
Even if the language of the amendment actually were ambiguous and could be construed to permit an exception for worsening conditions, no legislative history suggests an intent to create such an exception. As the majority points out, the subject of worsening condition claims came up only once during hearings on the bill, maj. op. at 19, and the short comment quoted by the majority, from a representative of an entity supporting passage of the bill, apparently addressed itself only to the procedure for reopening an award, rather than the
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