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Georgetown University v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Services12/2/2004
n interrogatory in which she stated that she did not orally inform her supervisor of the incident until March 1, 2000, and that she did not provide written notice until April 25, 2000. The ALJ relied upon Owens' prior inconsistent statement concerning this material issue in finding her testimony at the hearing to be incredible. It is well established that the testimony of a witness may be discredited or impeached with prior inconsistent statements and that the trier of fact may use such evidence in assessing the credibility of the witness. See STANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA No. 3-8 (1998); see also Outlaw v. United States, 604 A.2d 873, 879 (D.C. 1992). It was within the province of the ALJ to consider, as she did in this case, the prior inconsistent statement in assessing Owens' credibility. See id. The ALJ also considered the lack of corroborating evidence of Owens' hearing testimony concerning the date that she provided notice of her injury. The presence or absence of corroborating evidence is among the factors that the trier of fact may consider in assessing a witness' credibility. See Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 165 (D.C. 1992); see also Cherner v. Lawson, 162 A.2d 492, 493 (D.C. 1960).
The ALJ, who heard the testimony and saw Owens testify in the case, was in the best position to make these credibility determinations and the factual finding at issue here. See Greater Wash. Bus. Ctr., supra, 454 A.2d at 1337. Since the ALJ's factual finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Director was bound by it, even if he might have reached a different result based on an independent review of the record. Pickrel, supra, 760 A.2d at 203 (citing Santos v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 536 A.2d 1085, 1088 (D.C. 1988)). In rejecting the ALJ's factual finding, the Director stated that Owens' testimony concerning notice was uncontradicted, and therefore, constituted substantial evidence of timely notice. The Director thought, mistakenly, that the record did not bear out that Owens' testimony was contradicted by her answers to interrogatories. This led to the Director's error in rejecting the ALJ's factual findings as unsupported by substantial evidence and reversing the decision. The ALJ's determination that Owens failed to provide her employer with timely notice as required by D.C. Code § 32-1513 is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and the Director was bound to accept it.
III.
As stated at the beginning of the opinion, after submission of this case, this court held in another matter that a claim for causally related medical benefits is not barred by an employee's failure to give timely notice as required by D.C. Code § 32-1513. Safeway Stores, supra, 832 A.2d at 1268, 1271. In challenging the ALJ's determination that her claim was untimely, Owens raised this alternative issue. Having reversed the ALJ's decision on other grounds, the Director viewed the issue as moot, and therefore, did not decide it. In light of our disposition, the case must be remanded to the agency for consideration of Owens' alternative ground for reversing the ALJ's decision. See Kralick, supra, 842 A.2d at 713 (citations omitted) (On appeal, this court will sustain the agency's decision only on the grounds upon which it relied.); accord, Jones, supra, 519 A.2d at 709.
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Director and remand the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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