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Sheppard v. Rebidas12/9/2004
cember 21 accident.
In so finding, we reject Sentry's argument that the court had an obligation to protect Sentry's alleged interests in this case. Sentry cites several cases for the proposition that the Act imposes a duty upon the court to protect an employer's lien. See Freer v. Hysan Corp., 108 Ill. 2d 421 (1985) (responsibility lies with the trial court to protect an employer's lien rights vis-a-vis an employee's settlement with a third party); Page v. Hibbard, 119 Ill. 2d 41 (1987) (cause remanded to trial court to determine whether allocation of a settlement agreement between an injured employee and a third party was fair and reasonable or if it inequitably circumvented employer's workers' compensation lien); Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck & Equipment Co., 143 Ill. 2d 188 (1991) (where settlements between the employee and a third party represent an obvious attempt to circumvent the employer's workers' compensation lien, the trial court should intervene to protect the employer). We note, however, that the Illinois Supreme Court's holdings in these cases were premised on the notion that it is unfair for an employee to manipulate a settlement with a third party in a manner which would circumvent his employer's workers' compensation lien where the employer is not a party to that settlement and cannot protect itself. Such is not found in the instant case. Unlike the employers in Freer, Blagg, and Page, who were not parties to the settlement agreements which served to deprive them of their liens, Sentry negotiated and signed the very agreement which precluded its recovery. The Act cannot be read to require the court to step in under these circumstances to save Sentry from itself.
Affirmed.
REID, P.J., and THEIS, J., concur.
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