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Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Board v. Edwards12/15/2004
r in East Baton Rouge Parish.
We note that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Kelty v. Brumfield, 96-0869 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/12/97), 691 So. 2d 242, writ denied, 97-0918, 97-0936 (La. 5/16/97), 693 So. 2d 800 and Medical Review Panel v. Smith, 1998-2603 (La. App. 4th Cir. 6/9/99), 736 So. 2d 1033 determined that the proper venue for review of decisions by the PCFOB regarding future medical care and related benefits is in East Baton Rouge Parish under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, La. R.S. 49:964. In Medical Review Panel v. Smith, supra, the court determined that "continuing jurisdiction" granted by La. R.S. 40:1299.43(E) did not confer jurisdiction to review the PCFOB's disposition of claims for future medical expenses. This conclusion was based on the supreme court's decision in Kelty, 93-1142 (La. 2/25/94), 633 So. 2d 1210, which discussed the limited role of courts under La. R.S. 40:1299.43. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the supreme court's reference in Kelty, supra, to court review of the PCFOB's actions "pursuant to well established principles of judicial review" to mean the review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Our review of La. R.S. 40:1299.43 and the supreme court's Kelty decision leads us to disagree with the Fourth Circuit's venue determination. As stated, La. R.S. 40:1299.43(E)(1) grants continuing jurisdiction to the district court which rendered the final judgment in cases where future medical care and related benefits are needed by the patient. It is evident that the grant of continuing jurisdiction requires that venue exists in the district court which rendered the final judgment. Otherwise, continuing jurisdiction would have no meaning. And the supreme court's Kelty opinion did not squarely address the scope of the continuing jurisdiction provision as that opinion only dealt with the issue of original jurisdiction and decision making related to claims for future medical expenses. We view the supreme court's limited references in Kelty to the district court's continuing jurisdiction as dicta, and we decline to follow the Fourth Circuit's interpretation. From our review, we find that the "continuing jurisdiction" provision vests subject matter jurisdiction and venue, for purposes of judicial review of the PCFOB's actions on claims for future medical expenses and related benefits, in the district court from which the final judgment issued which determined a need for future medical expenses.
Moreover, our interpretation of continuing jurisdiction is supported by the statute, which also provides that the court shall award attorney fees upon finding that the PCFOB unreasonably failed to pay a claim for medical care within thirty days after submission of the claim. See La. R.S. 40:1299.43(E)(2). Judicial efficiency compels the conclusion that the court empowered to award attorney fees would also have the authority to review the PCFOB's actions on the claim in order to determine whether the PCFOB was unreasonable in failing to pay within the thirty day time period or whether its failure to pay the claim was reasonable.
In accordance with our interpretation of the continuing jurisdiction provision and other reasons expressed, we find that venue would be proper in the Fourth Judicial District Court in the event that subject matter jurisdiction exists.
The PCFOB also complains that the trial court erred in ordering it to begin renovations to Mr. Edwards' home without holding a trial on the merits. We agree. While we understand the trial court's apparent frustration with this matter, we find no evidentiary basis in the record for the ruling at this point in the proceeding. Accord
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