 |
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Arrabal v. Crew-Taylor12/3/2004 ted the bills to her insurance company, but she did not know whether her insurer had paid the bills. In addition, she said that she was currently employed as a correctional officer and earned $42,000 per year; her husband makes $15,000-$20,000 annually.
After Mrs. Crew-Taylor testified, counsel for appellees proffered that, if Mrs. Crew-Taylor were recalled as a witness, she would testify that (1) the $636,414.90 bill had been paid by "Blue Cross"; (2) "Blue Cross/Blue Shield" had a lien in the amount of $583,474 "to get them reimbursed back"; (3) Mrs. Crew-Taylor and her husband "are having financial difficulties" inasmuch as they "are either in bankruptcy or almost in bankruptcy; and (4) Mrs. Crew-Taylor and her husband "do not have the finances" to pay the $636,414.90 bill. Counsel for appellants accepted the proffer, as did the court, and all agreed that the facts in the proffer could be utilized by the court in making the legal determination as to whether Che's estate had established a right to recover for past medical expenses. The trial judge ruled that the estate had presented sufficient evidence to prove such a claim.
Except for Che's medical expenses, there was no evidence of any other medical expenses incurred in the subject case. Nevertheless, the jury was asked to determine the amount of "past medical expenses" incurred by Mrs. Crew-Taylor (Question 5B) and by Che's estate (Question 5A). The jury foreperson at some point answered 5B by writing down the figure $636,414.90, but that figure was later scratched out and replaced with a zero.
In instructing the jury, the trial court provided no guidance as to how the jury should determine whether Mrs. Crew-Taylor or the estate was entitled to recover for the past medical expenses. The trial court simply read the verdict sheet to the jury.
Appellants' counsel did not object to the portion of the verdict sheet concerning the claim of Mrs. Crew-Taylor for recompense for Che's past medical expenses. But defense counsel did object to the verdict sheet's Question 5A; appellants' counsel took the position that Che's estate had not produced sufficient evidence to allow the jury to consider the estate's claim for past medical expenses. Whether defense counsel's position was well taken is controlled by Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679 (1997).
Travis Pepper was born with severe genetic problems. Id. at 684. He was taken to Johns Hopkins Hospital ("Hopkins"), where he underwent two surgical procedures. Unfortunately, he met with post-operative complications, which led to severe neurological impairment. Id. at 684.
Approximately two years after the last of Travis's operations, Travis's parents consulted an attorney concerning a possible malpractice action against Hopkins. Four years after that consultation, Travis's parents, individually and as Travis's next friend, sued Hopkins for medical malpractice. Id. at 685. Travis's parents' claim for past medical expenses was subsequently dismissed because it was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Id.
Prior to trial, Hopkins filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing any evidence concerning the medical expenses incurred by Travis or his parents as a result of the (alleged) malpractice. Id. at 686. Citing the Garay case, Hopkins maintained that a claim for pre-majority medical expenses belonged solely to Travis's parents. Because the parents' claim was barred by limitations, Hopkins asserted that no evidence as to medical bills was admissible. Id.
The Peppers conceded that a claim for pre-majority expenses ordinarily belongs to the parents of an injured child but
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|