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Arrabal v. Crew-Taylor12/3/2004
enses would not be covered by the parents' medical insurance.
It is, of course, true that without insurance neither Mrs. Crew- Taylor nor her husband would have been able to afford to pay Che's medical bills. But, as Pepper makes clear, the amount of insurance coverage cannot be ignored. Id. at 701. After Mrs. Crew-Taylor testified that she had submitted her bills to her insurer but did not know if they had been paid, appellees' counsel proffered that the $636,414.90 bill had been paid by "Blue Cross/Blue Shield." Inasmuch as Che's estate failed to prove that Che's parents were unable or unwilling to pay those expenses, the trial court erred in allowing the jury to decide whether the estate was entitled to recover for Che's past medical expenses.
Appellees contend that, if appellants' position prevails, the collateral source rule would be "eviscerated."
The collateral source rule permits an injured person to recover the full amount of his or her provable damages, "regardless of the amount of compensation which the person has received for his injuries from sources unrelated to the tortfeasor."
Haischer v. CSX Corporation, 381 Md. 119, 132 (emphasis added) (quoting Motor Vehicle Admin. v . Seidel, 326 Md. 237, 253 (1992)).
Here, the collateral source rule, as applied to the estate, is inapplicable because the estate had no provable damages for which it was responsible. As stated earlier, a minor's estate, unless one of the Garay exceptions applies, is not liable for medical bills incurred. Because the estate (unlike the parents) was never liable for the expenses, the estate had no right to recover them.
Appellees also contend that appellants have "waived" their argument that the estate cannot recover for the medical expenses. Appellees word this argument as follows:
Dr. Arrabal's stipulation in the lower court to the fairness and reasonableness of the medical expenses that the jury awarded in the survival action is a sufficient basis for affirming that award. In both of the cases that Dr. Arrabal relies upon in challenging the award, the party opposing the request for an award of medical expenses filed pre-trial motions seeking to dismiss such a claim, see Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 344-45 (1993), or "to exclude any evidence concerning medical expenses incurred." Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 686 (1997). Dr. Arrabal did not file any such motion but rather stated that he had no objection to admitting into evidence the medical bills that he now argues the jury should not have considered when awarding damages to Che's estate. This argument has thus been waived.
(Reference to joint record extract and transcript omitted.)
Appellants had no grounds for objecting to the medical bills being admitted. In their complaint, the parents made a claim for reimbursement for monies expended for Che's medical bills and that claim was never waived or assigned by the parents. Their objection, which was timely made, was to the verdict sheet, which allowed the estate to recover Che's past medical expenses when the estate failed to prove that Che, as opposed to his parents, was responsible for payment of those expenses. There was no waiver by the appellants.
Lastly, appellees contend that the third Garay exception is applicable, inasmuch as it was proffered below that Blue Cross/Blue Shield had a lien against any recovery in this case. This is so, according to appellees, because it will mean that Che's estate will be responsible for paying the medical expenses, even if we concluded that the estate had no right to such a recovery. In support of that proposition, appellees quote Garay
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