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Arrabal v. Crew-Taylor12/3/2004
as follows:
f the minor could establish that the medical expenses were paid from the minor's own estate or that the minor is responsible for pre-majority medical expenses, then the minor would be able to bring a claim to recover those expenses. 332 Md. at 367.
(Emphasis added.)
The estate's argument begs the question at issue because it assumes the very issue under debate, i.e., whether the minor is responsible for the payment of the past medical expenses.
In an alternative argument, appellees contend that it would be unfair to reverse the judgment as to the past medical expenses because, if we did so, the estate will receive nothing, inasmuch as "the $583,474 insurance lien far exceeds the remaining jury award to Che's estate of $200,000 in non-economic damages." This argument is entirely speculative. First, nothing in the evidence or the proffer indicated whether the insurer even had a lien against the estate if the estate is denied recovery for past medical expenses. Moreover, even if the lien is against any recovery made by any party to the lawsuits, appellees suggest no reason why the $583,474 lien would not be applied against the non-economic recovery by Che's parents, which was in excess of $860,000, rather than as against the estate's $200,000 non-economic recovery.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment in favor of Che's estate for past medical expenses. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address Question 6.
F. Question 7
Appellants argue:
The trial court erred in denying appellants' post- trial motions on the grounds that the verdict was excessive, improperly based on sympathy, and the product of confusion, erroneous jury instructions and a defective verdict form.
Whether to grant or deny a new trial based on the contention that the verdict was too low or too high is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Buck v. Cam's Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 57-58 (1992). In making such decisions, the breadth of the trial judge's discretion is at its broadest. Id. at 57. See also Kirkpatrick v. Zimmerman, 257 Md. 215, 218 (1970) ("We know of no case where the Court has ever disturbed the exercise of the lower court's discretion in denying a motion for new trial because of the inadequacy or excessiveness of damages.").
As appellants correctly point out, there was a large disparity in the amount of non-economic damages awarded to Che's mother in contrast to the award to his father. Moreover, in view of the evidence, the award of pain and suffering damages to Che's estate was quite generous. Nevertheless, appellants have failed to persuade us that the trial judge abused her very broad discretion in denying appellants' new trial motion on the ground of excessiveness of the jury verdicts.
The contention that the verdicts were improperly based on sympathy is supported by no argument and therefore is waived. Beck v. Mangels, 100 Md. App. 144, 149 (1994).
Appellants argue:
After four hours of deliberation, the jury returned and apparently found that ppellants were liable both for negligence and failure to provide informed consent and apparently awarded non-economic damages ($1.4 million) and medical expenses ($636,414.90) solely to Mrs. Taylor. The trial judge was then required to re-instruct on the special verdict and directed the jury to return to deliberations with respect to the claims of Mr. Taylor and the Estate. Ten minutes later, the jury returned with an award for non-economic damages to the Estate ($200,000.00), and an award of non-economic damages to Mr. Taylor ($150,000). It apparently crossed o
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