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Putnam v. Sezgin12/2/2004
n until October 26, 1997. Id. However, the defendants filed a petition for bankruptcy on November 11, 1996, thereby triggering the automatic stay, which precluded the plaintiffs from filing their complaint. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations was tolled from the date of the automatic stay until the date the stay was lifted. Id. This Court disagreed, finding that 11 USC 108(c) is clear and unambiguous. Id. at 541-542. Where a limitation period fixed by a statute of limitations or similar non-bankruptcy law, order, or agreement expires during the bankruptcy stay, claimants have thirty days from the termination of that stay to bring their action. Id. at 543.
In this case, it cannot be disputed that the period of limitation set by Michigan law expired while the automatic stay was in place. Thus, 11 USC 108(c) permitted the filing of the medical malpractice action within thirty days after notice of the termination of the bankruptcy stay, which was October 31, 2002. Id. Plaintiffs did not file a valid complaint within thirty days of learning of the termination of the stay. Accordingly, they have lost their claims. Ashby, supra; Easley, supra at 912.
We disagree with plaintiffs that the thirty-day time period is not applicable. Specifically, we find no merit to their claim that the administrative order closing the case was an "order entered in a non-bankruptcy proceeding" and that the order allowed plaintiffs to continue litigating their case within a reasonable time of the lifting of the bankruptcy stay. The administrative order did not fix a period for commencing or continuing the medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs argue, without citation or explanation, that this Court should interpret the order as permitting a reasonable time for moving to reopen the case and thus, a reasonable time period should trump the thirty-day limitation of 11 USC 108(c). Because of plaintiffs' failure to cite authority in support of this position, their cursory treatment of the issue, and the plain language of 11 USC 108(c), we reject this strained argument. We also reject the suggestion that this case is unlike Ashby, supra. Plaintiffs argue that they should not be treated like the plaintiff in Ashby because they actually filed their complaint in contravention of the automatic stay. Plaintiffs provide no rationale, and we are unable to conceive of any rationale, that would allow us to reward plaintiffs for violating the automatic stay and provide them with an unlimited time frame to continue their litigation while holding the Ashby plaintiff to the thirty-day time frame of 11 USC 108(c).
Where plaintiffs' complaint was void when filed and plaintiffs failed to file a complaint within thirty-days of the lifting of the bankruptcy stay, we conclude that dismissal of their claims was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Because we affirm the ruling of the trial court, and alternatively find that the case should have been dismissed based on plaintiffs' failure to file an appropriate affidavit at the outset, it is unnecessary to consider the additional, alternative grounds that may support dismissal of the action.
IV.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court "erred" when it denied their motion for rehearing or reconsideration. The denial of a motion for reconsideration is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Herald Company, Inc v Tax Tribunal, 258 Mich App 78, 82; 669 NW2d 862 (2003). This issue may be deemed abandoned on appeal by plaintiffs' cursory treatment of the issue, without citation to appropriate authority. Houghton, supra at 336. Nevertheless, we have considered the issue, and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Plain
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