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Ferguson v. Gateway Insurance Co.12/28/2004
Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED.
Breckenridge, P.J., and Smart, Jr., J., concur.
Opinion:
The central issue in this dispute in which Douglas Ferguson and his family have sued Gateway Insurance Company is whether or not a horse-drawn buggy is a "motor vehicle." Ferguson contends that it is; therefore, Gateway, his insurer, was obligated by its policy's uninsured motorist provisions to pay for injuries caused when in 2002 the car he was driving hit a horse-drawn buggy. Gateway's policy restricted uninsured motorist coverage to liability to its insured by the owner or operator of an "uninsured motor vehicle." The circuit court concluded that Kramer's horse-drawn buggy was not a motor vehicle and granted summary judgment for Gateway. We affirm.
Pursuant to its policy's general liability provisions, Gateway paid for repair of damage to Ferguson's car resulting from the collision, which occurred on February 22, 2002, on a Daviess County highway. The mishap occurred when 16-year-old Mary Kramer caused the horse pulling her buggy to turn left into the path of Ferguson's car. Gateway refused to pay for injuries to Ferguson's wife, who was a passenger in the car and who sustained fatal injuries when the crash threw the horse through the car's windshield. The record indicates that Ferguson had purchased only liability insurance from Gateway--not coverage of medical expenses.
Ferguson and his children sued Gateway, Kramer, and Kramer's parents, who owned the horse and buggy. They alleged wrongful death against the Kramers and breach of the insurance contract against Gateway. While the lawsuit was pending, the Fergusons settled the wrongful death claim with the Kramers, giving them a complete release in return for their payment of $33,500. The circuit court overruled Gateway's objection to the settlement and approved it. For the remaining two counts, Gateway and the Fergusons filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the court granted Gateway's motion. The Fergusons appeal.
Our review of the circuit court's summary judgment is essentially de novo . ITT Commercial Finance Corporation v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corporation , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). For summary judgment to be proper, the circuit court must determine that the parties are not disputing any issue of material fact and that the party seeking summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04(c)(6); ITT Commercial Finance , 854 S.W.2d at 377. When we review an appeal of a summary judgment, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and we afford that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. ITT Commercial Finance, 854 S.W.2d at 382.
In considering the Fergusons' dispute with Gateway, the circuit court's obligation was to effectuate the parties' intention as expressed in their contract, the insurance policy. Butler v. Mitchell-Hugeback, Inc. , 895 S.W.2d 15, 21 (Mo. banc 1995). When contract language is clear, we discern intent from the document alone. J. E. Hathman, Inc. v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Club , 491 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Mo. banc 1973). The circuit court's duty in parsing the contract's language was to apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used--that is, the meaning that a person of average intelligence, knowledge, and experience would deem reasonable. Farmland Industries, Inc. v. Republic Insurance Company , 941 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo. banc 1997). The dictionary is a good source for finding the plain and ordinary meaning of contract language. Shahan v. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Mo. banc 1999).
Gateway's policy obligated it to pay Ferguson "compensatory damages which [Ferguson was] legal
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