Collins v. Collins12/21/2004
urt did not abuse its discretion in distributing the marital estate. The court properly considered testimony at trial Lonnie, acting in his individual capacity, encumbered the real property with a deed of trust to secure a loan from CitiFinancial, Inc., in the amount of $44,050. The court found Lonnie used $14,252 of the loan proceeds to pay off the existing mortgage on the real property and $2,048 was used to pay the costs of the loan. The remaining proceeds, $27,750, were used by Lonnie for personal expenses. The court presumably did not make additional findings as to the disposition of the remaining $27,750 because Lonnie did not produce receipts, invoices or other documents showing debt remittal, costs for improvements or replacement costs as he alleged.
Similarly, the District Court did not err in apportioning 55% of the marital estate to Gail and 45% to Lonnie. First, the court found the terms of the August 8, 2002, property settlement agreement were unconscionable and unenforceable due to Gail's inability to aid in its preparation, Lonnie's failure to disclose the value of the Frogfur business and the inherent inequity its enforcement would procure. Next, the court made extensive findings regarding the health, education and economic position of both parties. The court found Gail contributed as a homemaker and caregiver for Lonnie's children and mother. Gail suffered from a medical condition which necessitated spending at least $100 a month on medication and had no medical insurance coverage. Further, Gail was unsuccessful in running the Blue Bell business herself after the separation, was unemployed and did not have a college degree. Finally, the court found Lonnie graduated from Western College of Auctioneering and received $1,200 a month in fixed income from a back injury he suffered in 1979 that adversely affected his writing abilities. As such, the court distributed the assets according to the duration of the marriage, the age of the parties, their health, education and training pursuant to ยง 40-4-202, MCA.
Therefore, we affirm the District Court as to its distribution of the marital estate.
Finally, Gail requests we award her attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 32, M.R.App.P., based upon Lonnie's appeal of the District Court's order "without substantial or reasonable grounds." As a general rule, this Court will not impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 32, M.R.App.P., unless the appeal is entirely unfounded and intended to cause delay or unless counsel's actions otherwise constitute an abuse of the judicial system. In re Marriage of Moss , 1999 MT 62, 41, 293 Mont. 500, 41, 977 P.2d 322, 41 (citations omitted).
In this case, we hold Lonnie's appeal was based on substantial and reasonable grounds, and was not intended to cause delay. Indeed, Lonnie elucidated several arguments why the District Court's valuation and division of property could have been modified or reversed. However, we are satisfied from the record and presentation of the appeal no reversible error occurred. Accordingly, we will not award Gail her attorney's fees and costs for having to respond to this appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court as to its property valuation and distribution of the marital estate and do not award Gail attorney's fees.
JIM REGNIER
We Concur:
KARLA M. GRAY
PATRICIA O. COTTER
JOHN WARNER
JIM RICE
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