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Hardgrove v. Transportation Insurance Co.12/1/2004
Heard and Submitted: June 23, 2004
William Hardgrove appeals from the Workers' Compensation Court's determination that § 39-72-403(3), MCA (1983) (repealed 1985), bars his claim for Occupational Disease Act (ODA) benefits, and that that statute violates neither the Equal Protection Clauses of the Montana and United States Constitutions nor the Full Legal Redress Clause of the Montana Constitution. We affirm the Workers' Compensation Court.
BACKGROUND
The parties stipulated the facts in this case. W.R. Grace employed Hardgrove at its Libby, Montana, mine from 1967 until April 2, 1984. Transportation Insurance Company (Transportation) was insuring W.R. Grace during Hardgrove's employment. Over fourteen years after he stopped working for W.R. Grace, Hardgrove discovered he had asbestosis as a result of his employment. He filed his occupational disease claim one month and one day after this discovery. The law in effect on an employee's last day of work governs the resolution of an ODA claim, so the laws in effect in 1984 apply. Grenz v. Fire & Cas. (1996), 278 Mont. 268, 272, 924 P.2d 264, 267. Transportation denied his claim asserting that the three-year time period during which he could file his claim had elapsed under § 3972-403(3), MCA (1983) (repealed 1985).
Hardgrove raises three issues on appeal:
1. Whether § 39-72-403(3), MCA (1983) (repealed 1985), is a statute of repose that is not subject to equitable tolling under Bowerman v. Employment Sec. Comm'n (1983), 207 Mont. 314, 673 P.2d 476.
2. Whether, assuming it is a statute of repose, § 39-72-403(3), MCA (1983) (repealed 1985), violates the equal protection clauses of the Montana and United States Constitutions.
3. Whether, assuming it is a statute of repose, § 39-72-403(3), MCA (1983) (repealed 1985), violates the Full Legal Redress Clause of Montana Constitution Article II, Section 16.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the Workers' Compensation Court's findings of fact to determine whether substantial, credible evidence supports them, and we review its conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct. Hiett v. Missoula County Pub. Schs. , 2003 MT 213, 15, 317 Mont. 95, 15, 75 P.3d 341, 15.
DISCUSSION
I .
This controversy focuses on the characterization of § 39-72-403(3), MCA (1983) (repealed 1985), as either a statute of limitations or a statute of repose. A legislature can make clear it intends a statute to be a statute of repose if the statutory period for bringing the claim can lapse before the cause of action accrues. P. Stolz Family P'ship L.P. v. Daum (2nd Cir. 2004), 355 F.3d 92, 103.
Section 39-72-403, MCA (1983) (§ 39-72-403(3), MCA (1983), repealed 1985), provides as follows:
Time when claims must be presented. (1) When a claimant seeks benefits under this chapter, his claims for benefits must be presented in writing to the employer, the employer's insurer, or the division within 1 year from the date the claimant knew or should have known that his total disability condition resulted from an occupational disease. When a beneficiary seeks benefits under this chapter, his claims for death benefits must be presented in writing to the employer, the employer's insurer, or the division within 1 year from the date the beneficiaries knew or should have known that the decedent's death was related to an occupational disease.
(2) The division may, upon a reasonable showing by the claimant or a decedent's beneficiaries that the claimant or the beneficiaries could not have known that the claimant's condition or the employe
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