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Depalma v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh12/7/2004
ging suit about damages, yet take no legal action . . . the fact that further damage is caused does not bring about a new cause of action." Robertson v. City of High Point, 129 N.C. App. 88, 91, 497 S.E.2d 300, 302 (1998) (citing Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 329 S.E.2d 350 (1985)).
In the instant case, the complaint asserts that defendants were negligent in their treatment of and response to Marcus's October 1999 injury . By its own terms, plaintiffs' complaint alleges that defendants' negligence began on 15 October 1999. It is undisputed that on 15 October 1999 plaintiffs knew Marcus had been injured. Thus, "plaintiff's injuries were apparent to plaintiff and his [condition] could have been generally recognized and diagnosed by a medical professional . . . plaintiff's injuries and [condition] were not latent; thus, ยง 1-52(16) is inapplicableto the facts of this case." Soderlund v. Kuch, 143 N.C. App. 361, 370, 546 S.E.2d 632, 638 (2001). Moreover, defendants' "supervision" of Marcus in relation to his football injury also arose on 15 October 1999. Finally, the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint do not support their arguments on appeal that plaintiffs (1) were unaware of defendants' negligence or of the nature of Marcus's injury until November 2000, (2) were prevented by defendants from determining the extent of Marcus's injury, or (3) could not reasonably have learned of defendants' negligence or the extent of Marcus's injury at some time within three years of his 15 October 1999 injury. We conclude that plaintiffs' complaint fails to include any allegations that would toll the applicable statute of limitations.
We also reject plaintiffs' argument that the "continuing supervision" of Marcus by defendants between 15 October 1999 and December 2000 is the equivalent, for purposes of the statute of limitations, of a medical "continuing course of treatment." Plaintiffs cite no authority to support this proposition, and we find none. Moreover, " ur Supreme Court has adopted the 'continuing course of treatment doctrine' with regard to malpractice by hospitals and other health care providers." Delta Envtl. Consultants, Inc. v. Wysong & Miles Co., 132 N.C. App. 160, 169, 510 S.E.2d 690, 696 (1999) (citing Horton v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 344 N.C. 133, 472 S.E.2d 778 (1996)). This Court has not extended the doctrine to situations outside of the medical malpractice arena. See Delta, id. at 170, 510 S.E.2d at 697 ("inlight of the holding in Horton, which narrowly defines the 'continuing course of treatment doctrine,' we elect not to expand the doctrine's breadth"). Plaintiffs herein argue vehemently that they have not filed a medical malpractice claim, making the "continuing course of treatment" exception inapplicable.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that plaintiffs' claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and was properly dismissed by the trial court. Having reached this conclusion, we have no need to address the parties' arguments regarding the special requirements for filing a medical malpractice claim. The trial court's order is Affirmed.
Judges TYSON and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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