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George H. Lanier Memorial Hospital v. Andrews11/19/2004
ML because they acted in good faith under the Lifesaving Organ Procurement Act, Ala. Code 1975, §§ 22-19-140 to -144 ("the LOPA"), in arranging for the procurement of Steven's corneas. Cynthia and Andrews argue, however, that because they expressly withheld consent to the donation of Steven's corneas, it was not possible for the defendants to have acted in good faith.
In 1986, the Legislature enacted the LOPA. There is no dispute that a cornea, being tissue, is included within the definition of an organ in the LOPA. Ala. Code 1975, § 22-19-141(1). Section 22-19- 142(a) provides, in pertinent part:
"When death occurs in a hospital to a patient who has not made an anatomical gift to take effect upon death, the hospital administrator, or designated representative, shall request [either parent] ..., in the absence of actual notice of contrary indication by the decedent ..., to consent to the gift of organs of the decedent's body as an anatomical gift."
(Emphasis added.)
Subsections (c) and (d) of § 22-19-142 provide exceptions to the requirement that such a request be made. Although inapplicable here, these subsections relieve a hospital administrator or designated representative from the duty to request donation of an organ, either because no organ would be suitable for donation or because of other factors that lead the attending physician to conclude that no request for donation should be made.
Section 22-19-143 provides:
"A person who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this article or with the anatomical gift laws of this state, or another state, or a foreign country shall not be liable for damages in any civil action ...."
This Court has defined "good faith" as an "'honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.'" Andrews v. Alabama Eye Bank, 727 So. 2d 62, 65 (Ala. 1999)(quoting Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 136 Misc. 2d 1065, 519 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1987)). Presumably, the good-faith exception absolves hospital administrators or other designated representatives from liability for failing to request donation when they believe that one of the exceptions enumerated in § 22-19-142(c) or (d) applies.
Ivey argues that § 22-19-143 offers him good-faith immunity because, he says, he acted on an honest belief that Cynthia had consented to donating Steven's corneas. We agree that Ivey complied with the LOPA, regardless of the good-faith-immunity provision. However, we reach that conclusion because we take a narrow view of the requirements of the LOPA. It is clear from looking to the statute in search of its plain meaning that the LOPA imposes only one duty upon a hospital administrator or its designated representative: the duty of inquiry. The LOPA imposes no duty upon the inquirer or the institution to actually follow through and implement the instructions of the parties from whom consent is requested. "It is true that looking at a statute we might sometimes think that the ramifications of the words are inefficient or unusual. However, it is our job to say what the law is, not to say what it should be." DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 276 (Ala. 1998). Consequently, once Ivey requested consent from Cynthia, he had technically fulfilled the mandate of the LOPA.
This determination, however, does not end the inquiry. Ivey's complete fulfillment of the discrete duty imposed by the LOPA does not necessarily mean that he fulfilled all applicable duties of care. Under our standard of review of a ruling on a motion for a JML, we are compelled to view the facts in the light mo
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