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George H. Lanier Memorial Hospital v. Andrews11/19/2004
e only injury visited upon the plaintiff. Kmart v. Kyles, 723 So. 2d 572, 578 (Ala. 1998); Alabama Power Co. v. Harmon, 483 So. 2d 386, 389 (Ala. 1986). Once the plaintiff has presented some evidence of mental anguish, the question whether he should recover for such mental anguish, and, if so, how much, is a question reserved for the jury. National Ins. Assoc. v. Sockwell, 829 So. 2d 111, 133 (Ala. 2002); Kmart, 723 So. 2d at 578. This Court views the evidence of mental anguish claimed by each plaintiff to determine if that particular person should recover; one plaintiff's mental anguish cannot bootstrap the awarding of damages to the other plaintiff or plaintiffs. Alabama Power Co. v. Murray, 751 So. 2d 494, 500-01 (Ala. 1999). A jury's verdict is presumed correct, and that presumption is strengthened upon the trial court's denial of a motion for new trial. 751 So. 2d at 500-01. On the other hand, that presumption is weakened and we strictly scrutinize such a verdict when a plaintiff who claims damages solely for mental anguish fails to offer his own testimony of the mental anguish he has suffered. Sockwell, 829 So. 2d at 133-34; Kmart, 723 So. 2d at 578.
Despite our great deference to the jury's award of compensatory damages for mental anguish, we have not hesitated to remit such damages where the plaintiff has produced little or no evidence indicating that he has suffered such mental anguish. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Jeter, 832 So. 2d 25, 36-37 (Ala. 2001). The inquiry is not whether traumatic events have occurred, but whether the plaintiff has actually suffered as a result of those events. 832 So. 2d at 37. When a plaintiff's testimony amounts to little more than the obvious notion that dealing with the traumatic event was "hard" or "humiliating," we have consistently remitted damages. Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So. 2d 824, 837 (Ala. 1999). Additionally, when a plaintiff testifies merely that he suffered "a lot" of mental anguish, we have similarly remitted damages. Oliver v. Towns, 770 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Ala. 2000); Foster v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, 656 So. 2d 333, 336-37 (Ala. 1994).
In the case before us, however, the record is replete with testimony of the plaintiffs' mental anguish. Cynthia testified that the removal of Steven's corneas "has affected us a whole lot" and proceeded to state that she felt like someone had taken advantage of her. She testified to having dreams of Steven, yet she never sees his face anymore. In addition to her personal testimony, Dr. Kenneth Wade, her counselor, testified that the taking of Steven's corneas "greatly compound ... the difficulty of [Cynthia's] work at recovering" from Steven's death.
Andrews testified that thinking about the removal of Steven's corneas made him both angry and depressed. He felt that his depression over the cornea removal was separate from his depression over the loss of his son. Although Andrews was "glad" that two individuals were able to see as a result of the donation of Steven's corneas, that emotion did not negate or diminish his depression caused by the removal of Steven's corneas. Most striking is Andrews's testimony that he had a recurring dream that Steven sat up in his casket at the funeral, crying tears of blood. He testified that in his other recurring dream he finds himself in a hospital, where he "runs off" several doctors to find Steven on "the table." That testimony is also strong evidence of mental anguish.
With regard to both Cynthia and Andrews, we believe that the jury had enough evidence before it to award $100,000 in compensatory damages to each. We hold that each plaintiff presented substantial evidence that he or she suffered mental anguish. The fact that the trial court
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