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Vista Resorts11/18/2004
nship to the compensatory damages.
Accordingly, we conclude the treble damages provision of the CCPA does not violate Goodyear's due process rights.
VI. Equal Protection
Goodyear contends the CCPA's treble damages provision violates the equal protection guarantees under the Colorado and federal constitutions. We disagree.
Goodyear concedes that the rational basis test applies to the CCPA, because no suspect class or fundamental right is at issue. Under this test, a statute will not be found to violate equal protection if the statute is reasonable and bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state objective. Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993). The party challenging a statute must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory classification does not bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. Esser v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 8 P.3d 1218 (Colo. App. 2000), aff'd, 30 P.3d 189 (Colo. 2001).
The CCPA is a remedial statute intended to deter and punish deceptive trade practices committed against the public. Showpiece Homes Corp. v. Assurance Co., 38 P.3d 47 (Colo. 2001). It provides "prompt, economical, and readily available remedies against consumer fraud." Coors v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 91 P.3d 393, 398 (Colo. App. 2003)(cert. granted May 24, 2004). The treble damages provision furthers the CCPA's punitive and deterrent purposes and promotes private enforcement. Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1998).
Goodyear argues that mandatory treble damages under the CCPA violate equal protection because, unlike the imposition of punitive damages under § 13-21-102, no additional findings of willfulness or bad faith are necessary. We are not persuaded.
A party raising an equal protection challenge must show that the disputed classification singles out a group of persons for disparate treatment and does not subject other similarly situated persons to such treatment. Buckley Powder Co. v. State, 70 P.3d 547 (Colo. App. 2002). However, Goodyear does not delineate the classification on which it bases its equal protection challenge. Assuming that Goodyear's reference to § 13-21-102 implies a comparison between CCPA violators and common law tortfeasors, this classification affords Goodyear no relief. The jury found Goodyear liable for fraud as well as deceptive trade practices and awarded punitive damages under § 13-21-102.
Moreover, even if CCPA violators and common law tortfeasors were similarly situated, the CCPA's damages multiplier has a rational basis. Under the CCPA, a plaintiff must prove both that the defendant engaged in deceptive trade practices, which Goodyear equates to common law fraud, and that those practices had a substantial public impact. See Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc., 62 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2003). This additional element, not required to prove common law fraud, offers a rational explanation for the state's protecting the public by providing for a mandatory treble damages award.
Accordingly, we conclude the CCPA treble damages provision does not violate Goodyear's right to equal protection.
VII. Cumulative Error Doctrine
Finally, Goodyear contends the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors prevented a fair trial and therefore, Goodyear is entitled to a new trial. We disagree.
The cumulative error doctrine applies to criminal actions and is derived from a defendant's due process right to a fair trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16; see People v. Phillips, 91 P.3d 476 (Colo. App. 2004). Even assuming this doctrine applies to ci
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