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Vista Resorts11/18/2004
s, but argued that the Teflon jaw implants at issue were defective because the Teflon failed under the pressure and friction of the temporomandibular joint. In Shaw, the plaintiff argued that the General Motors chassis, which could be installed in different types of trucks, was defective because it did not have a backup alarm as delivered. The division concluded that, because the chassis would be safe without a backup alarm in many installations, General Motors had no duty to warn of the need for an alarm if a particular installation, such as the one that injured the plaintiff, impaired rear visibility.
In Childress, the court applied Michigan law to a case involving a hydraulic valve incorporated into a log splitter that injured the operator. The court noted the absence of any allegation that the valve was inherently dangerous as supplied to the manufacturer of the log splitter. It concluded, "in this case the valve was alleged to be misapplied rather than defectively designed." Childress v. Gresen Mfg. Co., supra, 888 F.2d at 49.
Here, in contrast, the evidence was uncontroverted that Goodyear sold Entran II hose only to Heatway, knew the Entran II hose would be used solely for radiant heating systems, and understood the requirements of such systems. Unlike in Bond and Shaw, Vista's use of Entran II in the heating systems did not increase the risk of the hose deteriorating and hardening, which, according to Vista, caused it to leak. Unlike in Childress, Heatway did not modify the Entran II hose before selling it to Vista. And Vista did not concede that Entran II could be safely used in any other applications, but instead consistently asserted that the hose was inherently defective.
On this record, we conclude the trial court did not commit substantial, prejudicial error by refusing to give Goodyear's tendered instruction on lack of a duty to foresee dangers resulting from use of the final product.
Nor do we discern error in the rejection of Goodyear's tendered instruction stating that a component-part manufacturer, without control over the design, assembly, manufacture, or distribution of the final product, has no duty to warn the consumer of danger arising from assembly of that product.
While this instruction finds some support in the language of White v. Caterpillar, Inc., supra, it is at odds with the broad statement in Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 170, 583 P.2d 276, 281 (1978), adopting the "majority view that a manufacturer of component parts may be held strictly liable for injuries to a consumer caused by design defects in the component parts when they are expected to and do reach the consumer without substantial change in condition." Further, Goodyear did not dispute that it participated with Heatway in matching Entran II to the design requirements of hydronic heating systems.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly rejected Goodyear's tendered jury instructions on its duty to warn.
C. Other Component-Part Manufacturer Instructions
We also reject Goodyear's argument that the trial court erred in rejecting three additional instructions regarding component-part manufacturers.
Goodyear tendered an instruction stating that compliance with the manufacturer's specifications for the final product may be considered in determining whether a component part is defective, citing Littlejohn v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 688 P.2d 1130 (Colo. App. 1984), and Union Supply Co. v. Pust, supra. However, these cases do not support this instruction on the facts before us.
In Littlejohn, supra, a construction worker was injured when he mistook a plywood board covering a large
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