 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Henderson v. Gandy11/22/2004
or any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state.
OCGA § 10-1-392 (a) (9).
The FBPA, however, does not provide a remedy for actions that do not and could not affect the general consuming public. Morris v. Budd, 226 Ga. App. 455, 457 (2) (486 SE2d 682) (1997). Further, proving a violation of the FBPA through unfair or deceptive acts or practices, within the meaning of the FBPA, does not require proof of intentional conduct on the defendants' part. Regency Nissan v. Taylor, 194 Ga. App. 645, 647 (2) (391 SE2d 467) (1990).
Consequently, suits brought under the FBPA "must serve the public interest and implement the purpose of the FBPA -- the end to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the public consumer marketplace." Zeeman v. Black, supra, 156 Ga. App. at 84.
One may bring a private suit under the FBPA only if he is individually injured by the breach of a duty owed to the consuming public in general. [The FBPA] does not encompass suits based upon allegedly deceptive or unfair acts or practices which occur in an essentially private transaction. In those circumstances, even though the plaintiff may be a "consumer" with regard to the transaction, if the deceptive or unfair act or practice had or has no potential for harm to the general consuming public, the allegedly wrongful act of the defendant was not made in the context of the consumer marketplace. Unless it can be said that the defendant's actions had or has potential harm for the consumer public the act or practice cannot be said to have "impact" on the consumer marketplace and any act or practice which is outside that context, no matter how unfair or deceptive, is not directly regulated by the FBPA. When a "consumer" suffers damage as the result of an unfair or deceptive act or practice which had or has potential impact solely upon him and which is not and could not be a source of damage to any other member of the consuming public, there is no public interest to be served by proceeding under the FBPA, and the aggrieved party is relegated to pursuit of relief under other statutory or common law principles.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 84-85.
The actions complained of by Henderson, i.e., the notations that Dr. Gandy authorized the treatment when he did not, were not actions introduced into the stream of commerce. Pryor v. CCEC, Inc., 257 Ga. App. 450, 456 (1) (571 SE2d 454) (2002). These notations were in Dr. Henderson's private medical records and presumably other patients' private medical records. By their very nature, the contents of these records are intended to be private and confidential, and not revealed to the general public. See, e.g., OCGA § §24-0-40; 24-9-41. Further, the evidence does not show that either the Atlanta Cardiology Group's policy or the notations in the record were made known to the general consuming public. Compare Campbell v. Beak, 256 Ga. App. 493, 496 (2) (568 SE2d 801) (2002) (private transaction subject to the FBPA because it was based on a newspaper advertisement). Therefore, these notations had no effect on the general consuming public, and they cannot constitute consumer acts or practices within the meaning of OCGA § 10-1-392 (a) (2.1) because the notations were not intended to encourage consumer transactions. For these reasons, Henderson's assertions that the notations were based on Atlanta Cardiology Group's general policy to authorize the WOCNs to perform treatment without specific orders from the physicians add nothing to her claim.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that Henderson's allegati
Page 1 2 3 4 Georgia Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|