 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Bynum v. Magno11/18/2004
alue of services rendered" is inapplicable, for the present case does not involve a provider who is suing for the value of the medical services provided or who seeks to recover expenditures incurred to third persons.
On the other hand, Restatement § 924, entitled "Harm to the Person," is directly applicable to determining the reasonable value of medical services for an injured person. That section is part of the Restatement's topic of "Compensatory Damages for Specific Types of Harm." Restatement § 924 provides that " ne whose interests of personality have been tortiously invaded is entitled to recover damages for the past or prospective . . . reasonable medical and other expenses." Restatement § 924(c). Restatement § 924, comment f, entitled "Expenses," reaffirms that "an injured person is entitled to damages for all expenses and the value of services reasonably made necessary by the harm." (Emphasis added.) In line with the collateral source rule, comment f cites to § 920A, and instructs that " he value of medical services made necessary by the tort can ordinarily be recovered although they have created no liability or expense to the injured person, as when a physician donates his services." Id. (emphasis added). Hence, we believe Restatement § 911, comment h, is not germane to the questions posed.
X.
We concur, then, with those jurisdictions that have held that a plaintiff, injured by the tortious conduct of a defendant, is entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical services and is not limited to the expenditures actually paid by Medicaid/Medicare. See Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 769 (explaining that "the test" for determining an award of medical expenses "is the reasonable value, not the actual charge"); Haselden, 579 S.E.2d at 295 (explaining that the amount actually paid for medical services does not alone determine the reasonable value of those medical services); see also Restatement § 920A, cmt. b (explaining that "it is the tortfeasor's responsibility to compensate for all harm that he causes, not confined to the net loss that the injured party receives").
XI.
Such a conclusion is consistent with the established practice in Hawaii courts for determining special damages for medical services, as embodied in Hawaii Civil Jury Instruction No. 8.9. The instruction does not limit special damages to the amount charged, but instructs that plaintiffs are entitled to damages for "the reasonable value of the the medical services provided." Hawaii Civil Jury Instruction No. 8.9 (emphasis added). Jurors are thus instructed that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for medical treatment, but these damages are not limited to out-of-pocket expenses. Id.
XII.
Moreover, allowing a particular plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of medical services leads to a more just result. The consequences of a contrary approach may penalize the recipient of Medicare/Medicaid payments. AARP reports in its amicus curiae brief, that "[Medicare/Medicaid], parts of the Social Security Act, together compromise the nation's largest source of public health insurance . . . and long term care services for the poorest and most vulnerable in society." AARP maintains that " pplying the collateral source rule helps to ensure that low-income elderly and disabled individuals are treated equitably vis a vis privately insured individuals by compensating for aspects of the [Medicare/Medicaid] programs that would substantially limit, if not completely eliminate, the beneficiary's recovery of special damages." Cf. Masaki v. Columbia Cas. Co., 48 Haw. 136, 142, 395 P.2d 927, 930 (1964) (citing Kopp v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Wis. 2d 53, 57, 94 N.W. 2d 224, 2
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Hawaii Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|