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Moore v. Moore11/24/2004
urces of the parties."
The evidence demonstrates that the financial resources of Earl and Debra were sufficiently disparate to permit an award of attorney's fees. In Glidewell v. Glidewell, this Court required attorney fees to be paid where the wife earned only $4,550 less per year than her husband. Since Earl's annual salary was significantly higher throughout the course of this litigation than Debra's, we believe the court's decision to require Earl to pay the fees was proper. Therefore, we affirm.
II. DEBRA'S CROSS APPEAL
Debra raises two issues. First, she argues the court erred by not awarding her interest on the proceeds of the investments sold by Earl after their separation. Second, Debra claims the court erroneously determined she and Earl only had a one-fourth interest in Pride's Clutch.
A. Pre-Judgment Interest
Debra argues she should have been awarded interest on stock that was purchased during her marriage and later sold by Earl after they were separated. She claims that although the DRC appropriately apportioned one-half of the proceeds to her, he failed to award any interest.
In Fields v. Fields, the Court held, " he determina tion as to whether or not to award prejudgment interest is based upon the foundation of equity and justice. It is a determina tion to be made by the trial court and to be disturbed by an appellate court only upon a showing of abuse of discretion." The Court further noted that interest on a spouse's share of marital property is not always warranted and should be awarded based upon the particular facts of the case.
We see no reason why Debra should have been awarded interest in this case. Although Earl sold the stocks without her knowledge, she nevertheless recouped one-half of the proceeds. There is no evidence, as there was in Fields, that Earl subsequently accumulated additional wealth as a result of the sale of the stocks. Nor is there evidence that Debra has otherwise received an unjust proportion of the marital debt. Therefore, the court's decision not to award her interest was proper.
B. Ownership Interest in Pride's Clutch
Debra's second argument is that the court erroneously determined she and Earl only had a one-fourth interest in Pride's Clutch. She claims the court should have found their ownership interest to be one-half.
Debra argues that Tim Moore, Earl's brother and the purported owner of the other quarter interest in the horse, did not actually pay for his interest when the horse was purchased. She contends Earl bought the horse on behalf of himself and Tim but that Tim never repaid Earl for his share of the horse.
We will only reverse the decision of a circuit court if it is demonstrated that the court abused its discretion. Debra has not demonstrated any such abuse. Tim testified he repaid Earl his half of the purchase price in cash. Moreover, the evidence indicates Earl and Tim were partners in Moore Brothers Stables, the company through which Pride's Clutch was purchased. It was within the court's discretion to accept this evidence. We do not believe there is any proof to contradict the court's findings. Therefore, the court's determination that Earl owned a one-fourth interest in Pride's Clutch was not an abuse of discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Knott Circuit Court is affirmed with regard to both the direct and the cross-appeals in this case.
ALL CONCUR.
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