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Renville v. Fredrickson11/16/2004
on's son, Jason, as Personal Representative, successfully prosecuted a wrongful death action on behalf of himself and Sorenson's other heirs. He pressed no claim, however, for Renville.
The District Court determined, and Renville did not appeal nor dispute, that she did not have standing to bring a wrongful death action under § 27-1-513, MCA, as she was neither Sorenson's heir nor his personal representative. It was on this ground that the District Court should have determined that Renville's claim for loss of consortium damages failed as a matter of law.
Allowing a separate loss of consortium action by someone other than a personal representative would create a multiplicity of lawsuits arising from the same wrongful death. Such multiple actions are in contravention of legislative intent. Prior to 1987, in applicable cases, both a "survivor" action and a "wrongful death" action could be brought for a single negligently-inflicted death. Section 27-1-501, MCA (1985) and § 27-1-513, MCA (1985). In 1987, the legislature determined that in those situations where both causes of actions were applicable, to prevent multiple lawsuits arising from the same death, the personal representative must bring both actions together. Furthermore, the legislature expressly stated that any element of damages available under these actions could be recovered only once. Section 27-1-501, MCA (1989).
A cause of action for wrongful death is a legislative creation. The legislature defines who may bring such actions, when they may be brought, and what damages may be sought. It is this Court's role to construe and interpret the law, not modify legislative enactments.
Again, as noted above, the parties did not appeal, argue or present this issue in their original briefs to the Court in Renville I ; thus, we limited our review to the issues presented. However, upon recognizing as a result of the argument presented in Frederickson's Rehearing brief on reconsideration, that our holding improperly expanded the rights available under the applicable statute, we are bound to affirm the District Court's correct ruling. As for the District Court's erroneous reason for reaching this correct decision, we have frequently affirmed a correct conclusion drawn by a District Court even when that conclusion may have been arrived at for the wrong reason. See Wolfe v. Webb (1992), 251 Mont. 217, 234, 824 P.2d 240, 250. This rule applies to the case at bar as well.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's Order granting summary judgment in favor of the Estate on Renville's NIED and loss of consortium claims.
PATRICIA O. COTTER
We Concur:
KARLA M. GRAY
JAMES C. NELSON
JIM REGNIER
JOHN WARNER
W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
JIM RICE
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