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Schmidt v. A-Best Products Co.11/22/2004
trongly in the party's favor. * * *"
{ } Pursuant to the above rule, a trial court may not enter summary judgment if it appears a material fact is genuinely disputed. The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The moving party may not make a conclusory assertion that the non-moving party has no evidence to prove its case. The moving party must specifically point to some evidence which demonstrates the non-moving party cannot support its claim. If the moving party satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 1997-Ohio-259, citing Dresher v. Burt, (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280.
{ } It is based upon this standard that we review appellant's assignments of error.
I.
{ } In her First Assignment of Error, appellant contends the trial court erred when it prematurely granted appellees' motions for summary judgment on the issue of causation. We disagree.
{ } Specifically, appellant argues the trial court did not follow its own case management order when it granted appellees' motions for summary judgment, on the issue of causation, because appellees did not file motions for summary judgment on the issue of causation and the time period to respond to causation arguments, according to the case management order, had not expired. Pursuant to the case management order, motions for summary judgment, on product identification issues, were to be filed by August 15, 2003. Motions for summary judgment, on all issues other than product identification, were to be filed by November 3, 2003.
{ } Appellant claims the trial court prematurely granted summary judgment, on the issue of causation, under the case management order. Appellant also argues appellees' motions do not seek summary judgment based on the issue of causation. Instead, appellant maintains appellees sought summary judgment solely on the issue of product identification.
{ } We begin our analysis of this assignment of error by noting the trial court granted summary judgment, to Appellees Dana Corporation and Lincoln Electric, on the issue of product identification. As to Dana Corporation, the trial court found:
{ } "* * * Although Plaintiff cites to various pages in the deposition testimony of Mr. Renshaw as evidence that Dana gaskets were used at J & L Steel during the applicable time period, the Court has reviewed the cited testimony and finds no reference to Dana Corporation."
"* * *
{ } "A review of the evidence presented by Plaintiff reveals that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in that she has provided no evidence that the decedent was exposed to an asbestos containing product manufactured by Dana Corporation, * * *." Judgment Entry, Nov. 10, 2003, at 5.
{ } The trial court also concluded appellant did not meet her burden regarding the issue of product identification as it pertains to Lincoln Electric. The trial court stated, in its judgment entry granting Lincoln Electric's motion for summary judgment:
{ } "* * * The Court finds that Lincoln has met this burden by citing the deposition testimony of co-worker, James Renshaw, and noting that Mr. Renshaw did not testify that Plaintiff's decedent was ever exposed to any asbestos-containing product manufactured by Lincoln. "* * *
{ } "Mr. Renshaw testifies that Lincoln welding rods were present at the
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