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Judd v. Drezga11/5/2004
but once again reference the Washington Supreme Court's treatment of this argument in Sofie: (1) Remittitur belongs to the judicial branch and is applied only after careful, case-specific review of the evidence; it is not an arbitrary, automatic, sweeping legislative reduction of damages. (2) There are well-developed guidelines for the imposition of remittitur, requiring strong presumptions in favor of jury verdicts. These guidelines require that the verdict be wholly unsupported by the evidence, motivated by passion or prejudice, or shocking to the court's conscience. (3) Perhaps most critically, the opposing party in cases of remittitur has the choice of accepting the reduction or seeking a new trial. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 720-21. The legislative cap includes none of these protections designed to give maximum deference to jury verdicts.
In Condemarin, I left open the question, not before us in that case, whether a damage cap on non-economic damages could survive constitutional scrutiny under article I, section 10. 775 P.2d at 366 (opinion of Durham, J.). I now conclude that it cannot. The legislature has improperly invaded the right to jury trial of plaintiffs with non-economic damages by rendering jury verdicts irrelevant in cases where the harm to victims of negligence is greatest.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS
As noted above, the power to reduce jury verdicts, under certain limited circumstances, has always belonged to the judicial branch of government. The doctrine of remittitur--the process by which the damages awarded by the jury are reduced--has been an inherently judicial power for almost two centuries. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 483 (1935); Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397, 412 (1896). In Dimick the Court carefully examined the origins of remittitur in the English common law and in American law. It observed that, "since the decision of Mr. Justice Story in 1822, this court has never expressed doubt in respect of the rule, and it has been uniformly applied. " 293 U.S. at 483. The Court also noted that remittitur of an excessive jury verdict is a question of law for the court. Id. at 486.
Utah courts have recognized and practiced remittitur since at least 1888. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 804 n.16 (Utah 1991). Utah law allows a court to reduce the jury's award of damages if " uch an award is so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion or prejudice, and it abundantly appears that there is no evidence to support or justify the verdict." Stamp v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 303 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1956). Remittitur serves as a check on the jury system and promotes both the administration of justice and the conclusion of litigation. Id. at 283.
This court has emphasized, however, that " uries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment of damages." Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1983). There is no set formula to determine non-economic damages such as pain and suffering, so "' he permissible minimum and maximum limits within which a jury may operate for a given injury are presently far apart and must continue to be widespread so long as pain and suffering must be measured by money standards.'" Stamp, 303 P.2d at 282 (quoting Duffy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 218 P.2d 1080, 1084 (Utah 1950)). The absolute right to a jury determination of civil damages and its importance have already been discussed.
Historically and at present, trial courts are given deference in permitting remittiturs because the trial judge is present during all aspects of the trial and can therefore best determine whether the jury acted with "passion or prejudice" in awarding damages. Crook
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