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Judd v. Drezga11/5/2004
ty of life damages. Judd would have the court determine, based on this information, that the crisis does not actually exist, thereby rendering the cap unconstitutional under the Berry test. Although Judd's arguments are well taken, and the court may remain unconvinced of the wisdom of limiting quality of life damages for severely injured victims like Athan, our power does not extend so far as to permit imposition of our views on such policy disputes.
Our job as this state's court of last resort is to determine whether the legislature overstepped the bounds of its constitutional authority in enacting the cap on quality of life damages, not whether it made wise policy in doing so. Although there are indications that overall health care costs may only be minimally affected by large damage awards, there is also data that indicates otherwise. See, e.g., Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 585-89 (Utah 1993) (noting pricing and investment decisions by insurers, inflation, etc., as factors contributing to increased health care costs). But see Office of Tech. Assessment OTA-BP-H-1 19, Impact of Legal Reforms on Medical Malpractice Costs 64 (1993) [hereinafter Impact of Legal Reforms] (recognizing that "caps on damage awards were the only type of State tort reform that consistently showed significant results in reducing the malpractice cost indicators"). When an issue is fairly debatable, we cannot say that the legislature overstepped its constitutional bounds when it determined that there was a crisis needing a remedy. Accordingly, we next consider whether the elimination of Athan's right to collect unlimited quality of life damages is a reasonable, non-arbitrary method for achieving the legislature's stated purpose of controlling medical malpractice premiums and health care costs.
C. Non-arbitrary, Reasonable Nature of Cap
We cannot conclude that the cap on quality of life damages is arbitrary or unreasonable. The legislature's determination that it needed to respond to the perceived medical malpractice crisis was logically followed by action designed to control costs. Although malpractice insurance rates may not be entirely controlled by such matters, they are undoubtedly subject to some measure of fluctuation based on paid claims. Impact of Legal Reforms, supra, at 73 (noting that "caps on damages . . . lead to lower insurance premiums"). Thus, one non-arbitrary manner of controlling such costs is to limit amounts paid out. Intuitively, the greater the amount paid on claims, the greater the increase in premiums. Limiting recovery of quality of life damages to a certain amount gives insurers some idea of their potential liability. Id. at 64 ("Minimizing these large awards may allow insurers to better match premiums to risk."). While we recognize that such a cap heavily punishes those most severely injured, it is not unconstitutionally arbitrary merely because it does so. Rather, it is targeted to control costs in one area where costs might be controllable.
Despite this court's concerns about the wisdom of depriving a few badly injured plaintiffs of full recovery, the cap is also constitutionally reasonable. Rather than cap all damages, like the cap struck down in Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), the limitation on recoverable damages in this case is narrowly tailored, by limiting quality life damages alone. While Judd notes that Utah has not seen large damage awards in significant numbers, this position ignores at least one important factor. Although quality of life damages are very real, they are also less susceptible to quantification than purely economic damages. As amici point out, " he estimated value of future costs forms the basis of the [insura
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