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Judd v. Drezga11/5/2004
nce] rate-setting process." The difficulty of predicting quality of life damages must be considered by insurers when setting rates and planning reserves. At least in some measure, then, predicting and controlling future costs can result in lower insurance rates. Taken as one of a number of measures enacted to help control health care costs, the cap on quality of life damages is thus a reasonable approach.
Having determined that the damage cap is designed to eliminate a social or economic evil, and that it is a reasonable, non-arbitrary means for doing so, we conclude that Utah Code section 78-14-7.1 does not violate article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
III. UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS
Judd next argues that section 78-14-7.1 violates the Utah Constitution's uniform operation of laws provision found in article I, section 24. This provision guards against discrimination within the same class and helps ensure that statutes establishing or recognizing rights for certain classes do so reasonably given the statutory objectives. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984). We employ heightened scrutiny under article I, section 24 when reviewing legislation that "implicates" rights under article I, section 11. Lee, 867 P.2d at 581. Sustaining legislation against an article I, section 24 challenge alleging that one's rights under the Open Courts Clause are constitutionally discriminated against requires the court to find that the challenged legislation "(1) is reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." Id. at 583. Although it causes great hardship for a small, severely injured group of plaintiffs, we find that the damage cap is reasonable, and it substantially furthers and is reasonably necessary to the legislative goal of decreasing health care costs and ensuring the continued availability of health care.
Judd's arguments before this court identify three important ways that the cap on quality of life damages might be unconstitutionally discriminatory. First, Judd notes that the limitation applies only to victims of medical malpractice, not to victims of other torts. Second, Judd points out that only medical malpractice victims with significant quality of life damages, as opposed to special damages, are affected. Last, Judd recognizes that the cap impacts only those who are most severely injured. We evaluate the damage cap under the heightened scrutiny standard with reference to these classifications.
In connection with our discussion of the Open Courts Clause, supra 10-18, we determined that the damage cap was a reasonable method of implementing the legitimate legislative purpose of limiting health care costs and ensuring the continuing availability of health care resources. That discussion bears on this section as well. However, in order to sustain the damage cap under article I, section 24, a higher standard must be met. The cap on quality of life damages must be reasonably necessary to achieve the goals, and, in fact, actually and substantially further them.
As we recognized above in connection with our analysis under the Open Courts Clause, we do not proceed in our analysis under article I, section 24 as if we were called upon to answer these questions in the first instance. Instead, we carry out our role as the state's court of last resort, called upon to identify the boundaries of the constitution, giving appropriate deference to the policy choices of the citizens' elected representatives. Our review of the arguments and
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