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Judd v. Drezga11/5/2004
ulfilled this role when it determined, based on its view of the evidence, that his quality of life was diminished to the extent by $1,250,000. However, the law as enacted by the legislature does not provide for such an award, and the trial court was compelled to apply the law to the jury's verdict and reduce the award to $250,000. So structured, the damage cap does not violate Athan's right to a jury trial because it allows the jury to determine the facts in the first instance, before requiring the court to apply relevant law to the jury's verdict.
VI. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Judd next argues that the damage cap violates article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, the separation of powers provision. The cap does so, Judd says, because it essentially allows the legislature to determine judicial controversies by fixing damages. We disagree.
We have recognized that judicial power is "'the power to hear and determine, controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation.'" Timpanogos Planning & Water Mgmt. Agency v. Cent. Utah Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 569 (Utah 1984) (quoting Citizen's Club v. Welling, 27 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah 1933)). Judicial power is, however, constrained by the law enacted by the legislature. As one former member of this court put it, " he power to declare what the law shall be is legislative. The power to declare what is the law is judicial." Ritchie v. Richards, 47 P. 670, 675 (Utah 1896) (Bartch, J., concurring).
There is a legitimate and long-established role for legislative involvement in jury trials. For example, the legislature establishes standards of proof, elements of torts and crimes, and otherwise controls much of the law upon which jury instructions are based. Given that extensive role in so many aspects of the jury trial process, it is incorrect to view the right to a jury determination of the facts of a case to be so broad as to prohibit any legislative involvement in the types and extent of damages that may be awarded. The damage cap represents law to be applied, not an improper usurpation of jury prerogatives. Consequently, it does not violate the separation of powers provision of the constitution.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's ruling limiting Athan's recovery of quality of life damages to $250,000 because the constitution does not prohibit it, despite its consequences to Athan.
The cap is designed to reduce health care costs, increase the availability of medical malpractice insurance, and secure the continued availability of health care resources--all legitimate legislative goals given the clear social and economic evil of rising health care costs and a shortage of qualified health care professionals. In attempting to meet its goals, the legislature has not unreasonably or arbitrarily limited recovery. Rather, it has chosen to place a limit on the recovery of "non-economic" quality of life damages--one area where legislation has been shown to actually and substantially further these goals. Applying each individual test, we conclude that the open courts, uniform operation of laws, and due process provisions of our constitution are not offended by the damage cap. Additionally, neither the right to a jury trial nor the constitutional guarantee of separation of powers is offended by the cap. Affirmed.
Justice Durrant and Justice Parrish concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins' opinion.
DURHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion analyzes the plaintiff's constitutional claims under the wrong standard of review and reaches the wrong result. The plaintiff has challenged
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