Associated Aviation Underwriters v. Wood9/29/2004
court did not err in refusing to dismiss Peter Paul Lopez's claim.
II. Trigger of Insurance Coverage
Aside from its Morris argument, AAU contends the trial court (J. Velasco) erred in finding, after the phase I trial, that AAU's "accident" policy covered Intervenors' claims. Both sides agree that the timing of Intervenors' injuries was a genuine coverage issue appropriately litigated during phase I. The parties disagree, however, on the extent to which Intervenors were required to prove their injuries and what legal rule we should apply to determine whether those injuries triggered AAU's policies.
16 A.R.S., Pt. 2. Because we have concluded that the trial court did not err in the first instance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying those motions. See Larsen v. Decker, 196 Ariz. 239, 27, 995 P.2d 281, 286 (App. 2000) (denial of motion for new trial reviewed for abuse of discretion).
AAU also claims the trial court should have amended its judgment in favor of Frederick Sianez because, according to AAU, he "alleged no illness, injury or disease caused by any substance." As with all of AAU's other arguments, however, whether Frederick Sianez was injured is an issue AAU is precluded under Morris from litigating. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to amend its findings or grant a new trial on Frederick Sianez's claims.
In analyzing this issue, we first focus on the pertinent insurance policy language. In doing so, we read the policy "'as a whole in order to give a reasonable and harmonious meaning and effect to all of its provisions.'" Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 175 Ariz. 354, 356, 857 P.2d 406, 408 (App. 1993), quoting Droz v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 1 Ariz. App. 581, 583, 405 P.2d 833, 835 (1965). Interpretation of an insurance contract generally involves questions of law, which we review de novo. Univ. Mech. Contractors of Ariz., Inc. v. Puritan Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 299, 301, 723 P.2d 648, 650 (1986); Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 193 Ariz. 581, 12, 975 P.2d 711, 713 (App. 1999).
The principal policy at issue here is AAU's accident policy, which was in effect from October 1, 1960, to August 1, 1969. Under that policy, AAU agreed " o pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay... for damages... because of bodily injury , sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person or persons, caused by accident." The policy specifically applies "only to accidents which occur during the policy period." But, the policy does not define the terms "bodily injury, sickness or disease," nor does it define the term "accident." In interpreting an identical policy provision, however, this court has stated:
No ambiguity is created by the lack of a definition for the term "accident" as used in the quoted [policy-period] provision. The word "accident," as used in insurance policies, has frequently been defined as "'... an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often accompanied by a manifestation of force...'" As used in this policy, giving to the word the meaning which a [person] of average understanding would, we think it clearly implies a misfortune with concomitant damage to a victim, and not the negligence which eventually results in that misfortune. Century Mut. Ins. Co. v. So. Ariz. Aviation, Inc., 8 Ariz. App. 384, 386, 446 P.2d 490, 492 (1968) (citations omitted); see also Outdoor World v. Continental Cas. Co., 122 Ariz. 292, 295, 594 P.2d 546, 549 (App. 1979) (noting "the general rule that covera
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 Arizona Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|