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Associated Aviation Underwriters v. Wood9/29/2004
sputes on whether TCE could have caused Intervenors' injuries at all and whether Intervenors had ingested TCE for which TAA/City had been responsible. See 103, supra.
As noted above, the trial court found that TAA/City had "lacked any information about the vast majority of the Intervenors," had not made "assessments... of the values of any individual Intervenor's claim," and "had not completed investigations regarding [several] significant defenses" at the time the Morris agreement was being negotiated. However, the record reflects that TAA/City did consider both the merits of Intervenors' claims to some extent and the substantial risks it faced if it chose to defend and lost at trial. Accordingly, we find no clear error in the trial court's finding that "a reasonably prudent person in [TAA/City's] position... would not be required to separately evaluate each and every individual claimant and the settlement value... for each individual claimant." For that same reason, the trial court's approval of TAA/City's consideration of Intervenors' claims on a "'global'" or aggregate basis was proper.
D. Evidence of Insurance Reserves
AAU also argues the trial court erroneously admitted, over its relevancy objection, and then improperly considered "AAU internal documents and recommendations" and "status reports which recommended insurance reserves" in making its reasonableness determination. "We will affirm the trial court's rulings on the exclusion or admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion or legal error and prejudice." Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 194 Ariz. 85, 7, 977 P.2d 807, 810 (App. 1998). We find no abuse here.
Essentially, AAU contends its own internal opinion on the extent of potential liability faced by its insureds is not relevant in determining whether the Morris agreement was reasonable. We agree that the amount of money an insurer sets aside as "reserves" in the event a judgment is entered against its insureds is, at best, minimally relevant to the issue of the Morris agreement's reasonableness. But, we cannot say this limited evidence prejudiced AAU such that reversal is required. Indeed, in view of the myriad other evidence the trial court considered in determining reasonableness, the trial court clearly would have reached the same result even if it had not admitted the challenged evidence. Id. ("The improper admission of evidence is not reversible error if the [trier of fact] would have reached the same verdict without the evidence.").
E. Specific Dollar Amount
Lastly, AAU argues the trial court erred in failing to assign a specific dollar amount for any individual claim. In doing so, AAU contends, the trial court violated the following principle recognized in Himes: " he trial judge is required to... determine, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, to what extent the settlement is reasonable. This requires the finder of fact to determine a specific dollar amount as reasonable as it is an amount, not a range, that will be enforced." 205 Ariz. 31, 22, 66 P.3d at 81; see also Waddell, 207 Ariz. 529, 17, 88 P.3d at 1146. Although we agree with Himes on that point, we disagree with AAU's claim of error.
AAU correctly notes that, in finding the agreement reasonable, the trial court concluded that " he amounts set forth in the Morris Agreement... are in the range of amounts that would be agreed upon by a reasonably prudent person in the position of the TAA and the City of Tucson at the time of the settlement." (Emphasis added.) Had the trial court based its ultimate ruling on that statement, the reasonableness determination would have been flawed. But, the trial court went on t
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