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Craven v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.9/9/2004
gment would be accorded in the State which rendered it.'" Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, supra, 810 P.2d at 656 (citing Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109, 84 S.Ct. 242, 244, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963)). A foreign judgment will be enforced to its full extent regardless of any errors or irregularities it may contain. See Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, supra; Restatement (Second) of Conflicts ยง 106 (1971)(a judgment will be recognized and enforced in other states even though an error of fact or of law was made in the proceedings before judgment).
Further, the Full Faith and Credit Clause generally protects the judgment of a court of a sister state against collateral attacks, unless proper grounds for the collateral attack can be established. According to the supreme court in Marworth, the proper grounds for collaterally attacking a foreign judgment are limited to "lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction of the rendering court, fraud in the procurement of the judgment, satisfaction, lack of due process, or other grounds that make the judgment invalid or unenforceable." Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, supra, 810 P.2d at 656 (quoting Wooster v. Wooster, 399 N.W.2d 330, 333 (S.D. 1987)). In that regard, the nature and amount or other aspects of the merits of a foreign judgment cannot be relitigated in the state in which enforcement is sought. Postjudgment relief available from foreign judgments under C.R.C.P. 60(b) is limited to the following grounds: (1) the judgment is based upon extrinsic fraud; (2) the judgment is void; or (3) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. See Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, supra.
Here, there is no dispute that the Arkansas court had personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and that the Arkansas judgment in Southern Farm's favor was a final, valid, and enforceable judgment in Arkansas. Accordingly, under the principles articulated in Marworth, that judgment was res judicata as between Craven and Southern Farm and was entitled to full faith and credit in Colorado.
Craven argues that the Arkansas judgment is contrary to the then existing public policy in Colorado concerning PIP benefits and that the Full Faith and Credit Clause permits a collateral attack on a foreign judgment that is contrary to the public policy of the recognition state. We disagree.
For purposes of this opinion, we assume, without deciding, that the public policies of Arkansas and Colorado concerning PIP benefits during the relevant period were, indeed, different.
The language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not reflect an exception based on the public policy of the recognition state, nor did the supreme court in Marworth articulate any such exception for collaterally attacking a valid judgment from a sister state.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that there is no public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause as it relates to judgments of a sister state. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233, 118 S.Ct. 657, 663-64, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998)("Regarding judgments . . . the full faith and credit obligation is exacting. A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land. For claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes, in other words, the judgment of the rendering State gains nationwide force." (footnote omitted)); Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449,
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