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Craven v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.9/9/2004
y. But our decisions support no roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith and credit due judgments." (citation omitted)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10, 101 S.Ct. 633, 638, 66 L.Ed.2d 521, 527-28 (1981) ("Different considerations are of course at issue when full faith and credit is to be accorded to acts, records, and proceedings outside the choice-of-law area, such as in the case of sister state-court judgments."); Smith v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 867 P.2d at 1264 n.7 ("determining which law to apply and determining whether to give full faith and credit to a judgment of a sister state are two different questions"). Moreover, the injured plaintiff in Ranger, unlike Craven here, was a Colorado resident and was not the insured under a contract with the defendant insurance company.
Further, all the out-of-state cases cited by Craven are distinguishable. See Tarnoff v. Jones, 497 P.2d 60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)(full faith and credit not required where judgment was not final under law of rendering state); Samack v. Travelers Ins. Co., 443 N.E.2d 765 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)(no valid sister state judgment at issue; decided on Illinois choice of law rules); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997) (British foreign judgment; decided on comity); Dart v. Dart, 568 N.W.2d 353 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)(British foreign judgment; decided on comity), aff'd, 597 N.W.2d 82 (Mich. 1999); Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter. v. Malhorta, 740 A.2d 703 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999)(Indian tribal nation judgment; decided on comity); Ragovis v. Ragovis, 124 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950)(full faith and credit not required where rendering state did not have jurisdiction over the parties); In re Riggs, 612 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)(full faith and credit not required where state rendering judgment did not have jurisdiction over the parties and did not provide due process notice to defendant); City of Yakima v. Aubrey, 931 P.2d 927 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)(full faith and credit not required where state rendering judgment did not have jurisdiction over the parties). Thus, none of those cases supports the broad proposition articulated by Craven that valid sister state judgments that are contrary to the public policy of the recognition state need not be given full faith and credit.
Accordingly, the trial court properly ruled that the Arkansas judgment in favor of Southern Farm was entitled to full faith and credit in Colorado.
II.
Finally, Craven argues that it is inequitable for the Arkansas judgment to have prospective application in Colorado because she has no viable way to pursue tort remedies against the driver of the car that rear-ended her. We are not persuaded.
As the supreme court noted in Marworth, postjudgment relief from a foreign judgment may be available under various provisions of C.R.C.P. 60(b), including C.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), which provides for relief if "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." The grant or denial of a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and, absent abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 925 P.2d 785, 790 (Colo. 1996).
C.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) is based on the historic power of a court of equity to modify a decree in light of changes in circumstances occurring after the date of the judgment. It is not a substitute for an appeal and does not allow relitigation of issues that were resolved by the judgment. Instead, it refers to some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable. See 11 C. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure ยง 2863 (2d ed. 1
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