 |
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Compton v. District of Columbia Board of Psychology9/23/2004 K.'s personality includes histrionic traits. While we do not credit or discredit these reports as evidence of F.M.K.'s untrustworthiness, the ALJ should have done so as the fact finder, particularly when the ALJ specifically represented that his decision was based in part on the exhibits admitted into evidence.
IV.
In the absence of corroboration strong enough to overcome the inference of unreliability flowing from F.M.K.'s availability to testify, petitioner's direct contradiction of her allegations against him, and the centrality of these hearsay allegations to the agency's decision, the hearsay deposition in this case did not constitute evidence sufficiently substantial to support the revocation of Dr. Compton's professional license to practice psychology in the District of Columbia. Accordingly the revocation order is reversed on the present record and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. See Hedgman v. District of Columbia Hacker's License Appeal Bd., 549 A.2d 720, 723 & n.2 (D.C. 1988) (indicating that a faulty administrative decision is ordinarily remanded to the agency for further proceedings except where a remand would be futile or merely academic, or where an improperly imposed suspension expires by the time the case is resolved on appeal); cf. Vill. Books, Inc. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 296 A.2d 613, 615 (D.C. 1972) (vacating an order revoking a license to operate amusement machines without remanding to the agency because the record failed to show that there was any competent evidence upon which new findings justifying revocation could be predicated).
So ordered.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 District of Columbia Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|