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Castello v. Kalis9/14/2004
mean knowledge of a specific defendant's negligent conduct, and would represent an unwarranted departure from existing precedent.
Moreover, we believe plaintiff's argument, that the 1993 injury was separate and distinct from the injuries that occurred in 1996 and 1997, is flawed. Notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, there was but one injury--a delay in the diagnosis of cervical cancer--which ultimately resulted in Vivianne's death. When plaintiff asks us to consider the alleged misreading of the 1993 pap smear as a separate and distinct event from the events in 1996 and 1997, plaintiff mistakenly focuses, not on the injury here, but on the separate acts of negligence that ultimately contributed, in one way or another, to Vivianne's injury. However, for purposes of determining when the statute of limitations period commenced, we are not concerned with the separate acts of negligence leading up to a plaintiff's injury, or to when those acts of negligence occurred, but, rather, are concerned with plaintiff's injury and when plaintiff learned that the injury was wrongfully caused. See Turner v. Nama, 294 Ill. App. 3d 19, 25, 689 N.E.2d 303 (1997) ("the distinction between the [statute of] repose period and the [statute of] limitations period is that the repose period is triggered by defendant's wrongful act or omission that causes the injury whereas the limitations period is triggered by the patient's discovery of the injury" (emphasis added)).
In summary, because the undisputed facts in the instant case show that the statute of limitations period commenced, at the very latest, by November 9, 1997, the two-year statute of limitations expired by November 10, 1999, and plaintiff did not file his claims against defendant until July 12, 2000, we find that the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment since no genuine issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. See Witherell, 85 Ill. 2d at 156 ("Where it is apparent from the undisputed facts * that only one conclusion can be drawn, the question becomes one for the court[,]" making summary judgment on the statute of limitations grounds appropriate).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
Affirmed.
CAHILL and WOLFSON, JJ., concur.
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