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People ex rel Director of the Dep't of Corrections v. Booth9/2/2004
hatsoever and any and all assets and property of whatever character held in the name of the person, held for the benefit of the person, or payable or otherwise deliverable to the person. Any trust, or portion of a trust, of which a convicted person is a beneficiary, shall be construed as an asset of the person, to the extent that benefits thereunder are required to be paid to the person, or shall in fact be paid to the person. At the time of a legal proceeding by the Attorney General under this Section, if it appears that the committed person has any assets which ought to be subjected to the claim of the Department under this Section, the court may issue an order requiring any person, corporation, or other legal entity possessed or having custody of those assets to appropriate any of the assets or a portion thereof toward reimbursing the Department as provided for under this Section. No provision of this Section shall be construed in violation of any State or federal limitation on the collection of money judgments." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3--7--6(e)(3) (West 2002)).
Furthermore, section 4--101(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/4--101(11) (West 2002)) provides that the Attorney General may attach the property of an inmate in cases brought under section 3--7--6 of the Unified Code of Corrections. An exemption exists, however, for an amount no greater than $7,500 from a payment received by the debtor due to personal bodily injury . 735 ILCS 5/12--1001(h)(4) (West 2002).
The plaintiff contends that the last sentence in sSection 3--7--6(e)(3) means that denying an exemption, such as the one in section 12--1001(h)(4), in cases involving the attachment of prisoner assets does not violate any state or federal statute. The plaintiff essentially argues that section 3--7--6(e)(3) authorizes the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General to reach as far as possible into prisoners' assets because the normal restrictions on attachments do not apply to prisoners. We do not believe the legislature intended this reading of section 3--7--6(e)(3).
The plain language of section 3--7--6(e)(3) does indeed authorize the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General to reach far into prisoners' assets; however, the last sentence forbids the Director of the DOC and the Attorney General from violating any state or federal law limiting a creditor's ability to collect in the process. Because the exemption in section 12--1001(h)(4) clearly applies to the defendant's personal injury settlement award, and because section 3--7--6(e)(3) clearly requires that the Attorney General honor such exemptions, we decline to construe section 3--7--6(e)(3) as denying prisoners the protections afforded to debtors in section 12--1001(h)(4). We therefore hold that the circuit court properly construed section 3--7--6(e)(3) when it applied the section 12--1001(h)(4) exemption in the case below.
The plaintiff also argues that a tool of statutory construction--when two statutes deal with a similar legal issue, the more specific statute controls--mandates that we vacate the portion of the circuit court's order exempting $7,500 from the award. Because the plain language of section 3--7--6(e)(3) is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to further tools of statutory construction and we need not consider this argument. See Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305.
The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
O'BRIEN and BARRY, JJ., concur.
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