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Schramer v. Tiger Athletic Association of Aurora9/7/2004
ion to strike or dismiss is not necessarily fatal; we may treat the motion as having been brought under the correct section of the Code (Illinois Housing & Development Authority v. Sjostrom & Sons, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 247, 253 (1982)), provided that the improper motion practice was not prejudicial to the plaintiff (Becker v. Zellner, 292 Ill. App. 3d 116, 121 (1997)). There appears to have been no prejudice here, and treating the motion as if it had been brought under section 2--615 also eliminates questions of timeliness. See Sjostrom & Sons, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d at 253. We note that a motion to dismiss under section 2--615 challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint and that an order granting the motion is subject to de novo review. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 228 (2003). Having clarified the procedural posture of this case, we turn to consideration of the parties' arguments.
Plaintiff initially argues that the trial court erred in ruling that Widmer was controlling. Plaintiff contends, as she did in the trial court, that the holding in Widmer is contrary to our decision in Muranyi. In Muranyi, the plaintiff's husband became intoxicated and caused an automobile accident in which he suffered injuries. The plaintiff sought recovery for the cost of her husband's medical care. The defendant did not dispute the existence of a cause of action under the Dramshop Act. Rather, the defendant contended that because the medical expenses had been covered by insurance, the plaintiff had suffered no loss and that a judgment in her favor would give her a double recovery. We disagreed, holding that under the collateral source rule, amounts received from an insurer do not operate to reduce the plaintiff's recovery in tort. In concluding that the collateral source rule applied to Dramshop Act lawsuits, we observed that " he legislature has specifically preserved a right of recovery by the spouse of an intoxicated person (see 235 ILCS 5/6--21 (West 1998)), and it is up to the legislature to place any limitations on the right." Muranyi, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 219. Here, defendant contends that this statement was merely obiter dictum and that the trial court was bound by Widmer, which was the only decision on point. Plaintiff maintains that the above language in Muranyi was judicial dictum carrying the weight of precedent.
Under the Illinois rule of stare decisis, a circuit court must follow the precedent of the appellate court of its district, if such precedent exists; if no such precedent exists, the circuit court must follow the precedent of other districts. Jachim v. Townsley, 249 Ill. App. 3d 878, 882 (1993). Nonetheless, the question of whether Muranyi or Widmer was controlling in the trial court is, ultimately, somewhat academic. While considerations of stare decisis deserve a healthy respect, we are not inescapably bound by our own previous decisions. Mueller v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 267 Ill. App. 3d 726, 732 (1994) ("The doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring a reviewing court to blindly follow its own precedents"). Nor are we bound by decisions of other districts of the appellate court. In re Application of County Treasurer, 292 Ill. App. 3d 310, 315 (1997). The question before us, therefore, is not whether Widmer was binding in the trial court, but whether it was correctly decided. As explained below, we conclude that it was not.
This appeal presents a question of statutory construction. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Marriage of King, 208 Ill. 2d 332, 340 (2003). In doing so, the court should look first to the language o
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