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Schramer v. Tiger Athletic Association of Aurora9/7/2004
f the statute, giving the terms their plain and ordinary meaning. King, 208 Ill. 2d at 340. Where statutory language is ambiguous, the court may look beyond the language of the statute and consider extrinsic evidence of legislative intent. Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill. 2d 480, 490 (2004). However, where the language is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Hall v. Henn, 208 Ill. 2d 325, 330 (2003).
The Dramshop Act provides:
"Every person who is injured within this State, in person or property, by any intoxicated person has a right of action * against any person, licensed under the laws of this State or any other state to sell alcoholic liquor, who, by selling or giving alcoholic liquor * causes the intoxication of such person." 235 ILCS 5/6--21 (West 2000).
In 1985, the General Assembly amended the Dramshop Act by adding the following sentence: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to confer a cause of action for injuries to the person or property of the intoxicated person himself, nor shall anything in this Act be construed to confer a cause of action for loss of means of support on the intoxicated person himself or on any person claiming to be supported by such intoxicated person." Pub. Act 84--271, eff. September 12, 1985. (A subsequent amendment further provided that the Dramshop Act also does not confer a cause of action for loss of society on the intoxicated person or any person claiming the society of the intoxicated person. Pub. Act 90--111, eff. July 14, 1997.)
Under the Dramshop Act as it existed before the 1985 amendment, it had been held that where the spouse of a person injured or killed as a result of his or her own intoxication incurs liability under the Family Expense Act for medical or funeral expenses, such liability constitutes an injury to the spouse's property, giving rise to a cause of action under the Dramshop Act. E.g., Bachman v. Sharon & Lo's Place, Inc., 185 Ill. App. 3d 40, 42 (1989). In Widmer, however, the majority concluded that the 1985 amendment to the Dramshop Act eliminated this cause of action. The majority reasoned:
"In this case, the claim is for medical and funeral expenses directly attributable to the injuries sustained by the decedent. Despite the characterization of the claim as an injury to the property of the surviving spouse, it is, in fact, one that factually and legally derives from and is inextricably linked with the action of plaintiff's decedent in driving while intoxicated and the resulting injuries to her person and her death. The amendment prohibits compensation for injuries sustained by an intoxicated driver, and that appears to us to be precisely what plaintiff is seeking." Widmer, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 283.
We find this analysis unconvincing. It is true that in the scenario presented in Widmer and in this case, the injury to the property of the surviving spouse is causally related to the injury suffered by the intoxicated decedent. That does not mean, however, that the injuries must be considered one and the same; the surviving spouse's cause of action is for his or her own injury to property, not for the intoxicated decedent's injury. Contrary to the opinion of the Widmer majority, Bachman and similar cases cannot be distinguished on the basis that they arose under the law as it existed before the 1985 amendment. Even at that time, an intoxicated person had no cause of action for his or her own injuries. See Gora v. 7-11 Food Stores, 109 Ill. App. 3d 109, 110 (1982); Bennet v. Auditorium Building Corp., 299 Ill. App. 139, 147 (1939). Since the law is essentially the same in this particular respect, we fai
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