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Schramer v. Tiger Athletic Association of Aurora9/7/2004
l to see how the amendment undermines the analysis of prior cases.
As Justice Barry observed in his dissent in Widmer, the General Assembly was presumably aware of how the Dramshop Act had been judicially interpreted prior to being amended and it presumably acted with that knowledge. Widmer, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 284 (Barry, J., dissenting). Under these circumstances, if the General Assembly intended to foreclose the spouse of an intoxicated person from recovering medical or funeral expenses, we would expect it to have provided for that result in explicit terms similar to those employed to bar recovery for the loss of the means of support and (in a subsequent amendment) the loss of society.
We note that, like the cause of action for medical and funeral expenses, the causes of action for loss of the means of support and loss of society "factually and legally [derive] from and inextricably linked with" (Widmer, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 283) the intoxicated person's personal injuries or death. If we accepted the Widmer majority's thesis that the amendatory language foreclosing " cause of action for injuries to * the intoxicated person" bars causes of action for injuries that derive from such injuries, the independent provisions addressing causes of action for the loss of the means of support and the loss of society would be superfluous.
To the extent that any doubt remains as to legislative intent, review of the 1985 amendment's legislative history lends further support to our view. In his dissent in Widmer, Justice Barry noted:
"During the House proceedings on the amendment, its sponsor, Representative Countryman, stated that the amendment 'does not take away that cause of action for ... by relative for the other 2 potential cause of action[,] that is[,] personal injury and property damage.' 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 23, 1985, at 162-63 (statements of Representative Countryman). In response to a comment that the amendment would leave the family of a deceased intoxicant without recourse, Representative Countryman specifically noted that the family 'does have recourse under the personal injury and property damage.' He added that ' nd there are some instances where the funeral bill[,] for instance[,] is a family expense, there may be some potential in that instance.' 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 23, 1985, at 168 (statements of Representative Countryman)." Widmer, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 284-85 (Barry, J., dissenting).
We therefore conclude that a surviving spouse's recovery of the medical, hospital, and funeral expenses for which he or she is liable under the Family Expense Act is not "a cause of action for injuries to * the intoxicated person himself" (235 ILCS 5/6--21 (West 2000)) and is not barred by the 1985 amendment to the Dramshop Act.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
BYRNE and CALLUM, JJ., concur.
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