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Walker v. Lewis9/20/2004
p. 3d 893, 900-01, 652 N.E.2d 1286 (1995). However, none of these cases involved a trial court's sua sponte sanction barring a defendant from rejecting an arbitration award. Instead, the trial court in each of these cases, under its Rule 90(g) authority, imposed a sanction barring the defendant from rejecting the arbitration award pursuant to a motion brought by the plaintiff. Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 1080; Gebbie, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 642; Williams, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 896. And in each of these cases, the appellate court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so doing. Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 1082; Gebbie, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 644; Williams, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 901. Because none of these cases involved the sua sponte action of the trial court, they are distinguishable and do not frustrate our construction of Rule 91(b) in the instant case.
For the reasons above, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in its sua sponte order barring defendant from rejecting the arbitration award. Because of this finding, we need not address the additional arguments raised by Walker.
Additionally, because we reverse the trial court and remand this case for trial, the second issue regarding Walker's motion to adjudicate, is moot because we are vacating the judgment award. An issue becomes moot "if the interests and right of the parties are no longer in controversy and the resolution of the issue will have no practical effect. [Citation.]" Adkins Energy, LLC v. Delta-T Corp., 347 Ill. App. 3d 373, 806 N.E.2d 1273 (2004). Liberty Mutual concedes this point in its "Brief of Lienholder." We therefore need not address this question.
The trial court's orders of May 29, 2003, July 8, 2003, and September 3, 2003, are reversed and the case is remanded for trial.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
CAHILL, P.J., and GORDON, J., concur.
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