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Neal v. Yang9/30/2004
ted as to whether the defendant had prior notice of the injury or illness, the court was required to find that the Act did not immunize the defendant from liability and to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Blanchard, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 972-73.
Based on the clear language of the Act and a review of the relevant Illinois case law, we hold that a physician need not prove the absence of a pre-existing duty to render aid to the patient in order to be immunized under section 25 of the Act. Rather, we agree with Blanchard that the pre-existing duty or on-call status of a physician is relevant only in terms of the notice requirement set forth under section 25. Here, we find that defendant's involvement paralleled that of the doctors in Johnson, Roberts, and Villamil, where the physicians were in the hospital treating other patients when they were asked to assist with an unfamiliar patient needing emergency assistance. Defendant had no physician-patient relationship with plaintiff and no contact with her during her labor or delivery. Thus, defendant had no prior notice of the impending emergency. Plaintiff concedes that defendant was not aware of the patient, the delivery, or any emergency regarding the delivery until she was requested to lend assistance to resuscitate Samantha. Because plaintiff does not dispute that defendant established the three elements required by section 25 of the Act, and we find that there are no other elements required, we must affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.
It is clear that the Act grants immunity to encourage physicians to give aid without fear of repercussions in a court of law. See 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 25, 1996, at 100 (statements of Representative Lang). Significantly, we note that, upon amending the Act in 1998, the Illinois legislature had the opportunity to limit the Act's protection to doctors who had established the absence of a doctor-patient relationship or a pre-existing duty. Instead, the legislature removed the notice requirement and therefore broadened rather than limited the Act's application. See 745 ILCS 49/25 (West 2002). The Blanchard court noted that 6 states' Good Samaritan statutes expressly allow immunity in hospitals, 12 other state statutes expressly disallow such immunity, and courts in 2 other states have held that emergency care in hospitals is not granted such immunity. S. Reuter, Physicians as Good Samaritans, 20 J. Legal Med. 157, n.1, 193 (1999). Although Dr. Stewart Reuter, the author of the article cited above, proposes that a uniform Good Samaritan statute be enacted to disallow immunity to doctors who render emergency aid to patients in hospitals, physicians' offices, or other health care facilities (20 J. Legal Med. at 191), we must apply the Act as it is written, and any change must be done by the legislature.
Plaintiff next argues that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether defendant had a pre-existing duty to provide NNR to Samantha and thus, was not a volunteer entitled to immunity. We perceive plaintiff's second argument to be substantially similar to her first argument. Moreover, because we find that defendant's pre-existing duty to respond to the emergency is not an additional element under the Act but is relevant only in terms of notice, we need not address this argument.
For the preceding reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
McLAREN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.
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