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Peach v. CIM Insurance Corp.9/24/2004
bitrate." (Emphasis in original.) DSMC Inc., 349 F.3d at 683.
We also recently addressed the issue of equitable estoppel in Ervin. We declined to extend the current definition of equitable estoppel as described in Illinois law and rejected the definition of equitable estoppel described in MS Dealer Service Corp. Pursuant to Illinois law: "A claim of equitable estoppel exists where a person, by his or her statements or conduct, induces a second person to rely, to his or her detriment, on the statements or conduct of the first person. The party asserting a claim of estoppel must have relied upon the acts or representations of the other and have had no knowledge or convenient means of knowing the facts, and such reliance must have been reasonable." In re Marriage of Smith, 347 Ill. App. 3d 395, 399, 806 N.E.2d 727, 730-31 (2004); see also Blisset v. Blisset, 123 Ill. 2d 161, 169, 526 N.E.2d 125, 128 (1988). Although estoppel may involve an "involuntary relinquishment," it also requires a showing " 'by clear, concise, and unequivocal evidence' " of prejudicial reliance. American States Insurance Co. v. National Cycle, Inc., 260 Ill. App. 3d 299, 308, 631 N.E.2d 1292, 1299 (1994) (quoting Old Mutual Casualty Co. v. Clark, 53 Ill. App. 3d 274, 279, 368 N.E.2d 702, 705 (1977)); see also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kiszkan, 346 Ill. App. 3d 292, 299, 805 N.E.2d 292, 298 (2004).
The record in this case does not satisfy the requirements of equitable estoppel as defined by Illinois courts. When Peach entered into the contract that had an arbitration clause with Enterprise, she took no action from which CIM could have reasonably relied on to its detriment that she would arbitrate any claim she had against CIM. As we found in Ervin, the Illinois law of equitable estoppel is adequate to protect CIM. To expand the doctrine of equitable estoppel, as indicated in the previously cited federal cases, would unfairly deny Peach access to the courts and force her to arbitrate her claims against CIM, in spite of the fact that CIM was not a party to the VBO that Peach entered into with Enterprise. Ervin, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 517, 812 N.E.2d at 543.
CONCLUSION
Because we find that CIM cannot enforce the arbitration clause contained in the agreement between Peach and Enterprise, we need not address the issues pertaining to the arbitration clause itself.
Affirmed.
CHAPMAN, P.J., and KUEHN, J., concur.
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