 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Hoon v. Lightolier9/15/2004
tion within three inches of the fixture was a superseding and intervening cause of plaintiffs' damages."
The Hoons countered by pointing out, correctly, that Maryland law is clear that "there may be more than one proximate cause of an accident." According to the Hoons, the failure of the SHTPs to detect the excessive temperature conditions and cycle the lights was a concurrent cause of the fire inasmuch as that failure allowed the fixture to overheat and ignite the surrounding insulation.
The motions judge granted summary judgment in favor of Lightolier as to plaintiffs' claims for strict liability in tort, negligence, and breach of warranty. The court explained its ruling as follows:
The court finds that the warnings placed on the light fixture and in the instructions were adequate. The court finds that the manufacturer of the light is entitled to believe that one installing the light together with any insulation that may be applied near it would heed the warnings. The failure to heed the warning in this case is the proximate cause of the fire. Further, the court finds that the plaintiffs were on further notice that there may be problems with the insulation and the cause of the fire by the fact that other fixtures operated properly causing them to blink and indicating problems. If there is a problem with one fixture with blown in insulation, the court finds that one is on notice that there may be problems with other fixtures and that they should be checked. The court finds that the subsequent malfunction or improper design of the self-heating thermal protection switch on this particular lamp . . . that its failure to operate in this particular case does not provide the plaintiffs with another avenue for the jury to make a determination because the court finds that, for the reasons stated, that the Defendant Lightolier is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Immediately after the judge announced his decision, the following exchange occurred:
MR. ROSSI [counsel for appellants]: Your Honor, is that as to all causes - negligence, breach of warranty, and products?
THE COURT: I believe it is under the facts of this case, Mr. Rossi. The cause of the fire was the improper insulation.
MR. ROSSI: Are you finding, as a matter of law, that that was the sole cause, Your Honor?
THE COURT: I find it to be the proximate cause of this fire. I think that's all I need to determine. Okay?
The Hoons, along with their insurer, Federal Insurance Company, then filed this timely appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A.
As a general rule, we will only affirm the grant of summary judgment on the grounds relied upon by the motions judge. See Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695-96 (2001), and cases cited therein. Appellee does not urge us to deviate from that rule, and we shall not.
One of the reasons advanced by the motions judge for granting summary judgment was based on a "finding" by the court that because the Hoons knew, prior to the fire, that Gede had installed two light fixtures too close to the insulation in violation of Lightolier's warning, the Hoons had an obligation to check all other Lightolier light fixtures installed by Gede to see if a similar problem existed. Presumably, although the motions judge did not say so explicitly, he held the view that the failure to check all other light fixtures barred the plaintiffs' claims either because the Hoons assumed the risk of injury or because they were contributorily negligent as a matter of law (or both).
In its brief, Lightolier does not even argue that summary judgment can be affirmed on the fo
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Maryland Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|