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Grahovac v. Munising Township9/21/2004
cluding that the Munising Township Volunteer Fire Department is a level of government.
Last, we note that plaintiff implores us to find that defendant is not absolutely immune because he is a volunteer fire chief and because of his part-time employment status. We find nothing in MCL 691.1407(5) to support that line of reasoning. The plain language of the statute does not limit absolute immunity to either paid or full-time positions. Although the qualified immunity provision of MCL 691.1407(2) encompasses volunteers, that provision applies only in the absence of other applicable statutory provisions. Id. Thus, we caution that our holding today that defendant is not absolutely immune from tort liability is premised not on his volunteer or part-time employment status but on the fact that he is not the highest elected or appointed executive official of a level of government. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed. We do not retain jurisdiction.
William C. Whitbeck, Stephen L. Borrello.
GRIFFIN, J. (dissenting).
The primary issue presented on appeal is whether a fire chief of a township fire department is entitled to absolute governmental immunity, pursuant to MCL 691.1407(5). I would hold that defendant Harold Anderson, as the township fire chief, is afforded such immunity. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent, and I would reverse the denial of defendant's motion for summary disposition.
I.
The overriding goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the statutory language. Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 597; 664 NW2d 705 (2003). If the plain meaning of the language is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). "Similarly, courts may not speculate about an unstated purpose where the unambiguous text plainly reflects the intent of the Legislature." Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). "Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly go beyond the words of the statute to ascertain legislative intent." Sun Valley Foods Co, supra at 236.
MCL 691.1407(5) provides:
(5) A judge, a legislator, and the elective or highest appointive executive official of all levels of government are immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her judicial, legislative, or executive authority.
In the present case, there is no dispute that Fire Chief Anderson is the highest appointive executive official of the Munising Township Fire Department. Accordingly, to determine whether defendant is entitled to absolute immunity, this Court must decide whether a township fire department is a level of government. Unfortunately, the Governmental Immunity Act does not define the term "all levels of government." However, other terms used in the act are defined. See MCL 691.1401. Of significance to the instant appeal is the term "governmental agency," which is used throughout the act and is specifically defined as follows: "'Governmental agency' means the state or a political subdivision." MCL 691.1401(d). While the majority concludes that a township fire department does not share any attributes of a political subdivision, the Governmental Immunity Act defines the term "political subdivision" as including a "department" (MCL 691.1401(b)) of a "township" (MCL 691.1401(a)). Thus, because a township fire department is a political subdivision
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