 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Clifford v. Geritom Med9/28/2004
hat would include all previously dismissed third-party defendants, and (2) did the trial court err in granting the motions of all third-party defendants seeking dismissal pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) on the basis of lack of common liability between them and Geritom? In addition to recognizing that the issues to be addressed in this opinion are related, we are cognizant also of the claims made by Geritom against each of the third-party defendants - North Memorial Hospital and the Park Nicollet parties - and of their responses to those claims. Therefore, to the extent feasible, we separately address the claims in regard to each third-party defendant.
Whether common liability exists is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Nuessmeier Elec., Inc. v. Weiss Mfg. Co., 632 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 2001). The question of whether to grant a new trial is within the discretion of the district court, which will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Clifford v. Geritom Med, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 2004) (Clifford II); Halla Nursery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 454 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1990).
North Memorial Hospital
A. Superseding Cause
We begin our analysis of the remanded issues by concluding that to the extent Geritom continues to argue that North Memorial's negligence is a superseding cause in this matter, that argument is without merit. " he general rule is that a negligent actor is responsible for all injuries which proximately result from a negligent action." However, the doctrine of superseding cause is an exception to this rule. Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1992). When the actual injury is caused by a superseding, intervening event, the original negligent actor will not be liable. Id. Before an intervening cause will be considered a superseding cause, the following four elements must be present:
1) its harmful effects must have occurred after the original negligence; 2) it must not have been brought about by the original negligence; 3) it must have actively worked to bring about a result which would not otherwise have followed from the original negligence; and 4) it must not have been reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer.
Can. by Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 507 (Minn. 1997).
During the second trial, Geritom's superseding-cause argument was rejected by the trial court on the basis that the superseding-cause doctrine had no application in this case. A similar motion made by Geritom after the conclusion of the second trial was also rejected by the trial court.
The supreme court addressed superseding cause in its review of this court's opinion. Clifford II, 681 N.W.2d at 687. First, the supreme court noted that North Memorial obtained the prescription information from the bottle of Lithobid dispensed by Geritom, and that when North Memorial dispensed Lithobid to Clifford, it was following its policy of continuing preadmission medication. Id. The court stated, " e concur with the district court's apparent conclusion that North Memorial would not have dispensed and administered Lithobid if not for the prescription information found on the bottle of Lithobid." Id.
Next, in addressing Geritom's arguments that the first jury verdict should have been upheld, the supreme court distinguished cases cited by Geritom in which a "superseding cause was legally cognizable" noting that "here the district court specifically denied Geritom's request for a superseding cause instruction." Id. at 688. Further, in its decision granting a new trial, the district court explained that the
Page 1 2 3 4 Minnesota Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|