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[W] Renville v. Fredrickson8/31/2004
here is simply no need for yet another judicially created "remedy."
I would affirm the decision of the District Court in its entirety and I dissent from the Court's failure to do so.
KARLA M. GRAY
Justice Jim Rice and Justice John Warner join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.
JOHN WARNER
JIM RICE
Justice Jim Rice concurring and dissenting.
I join the concurring and dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Gray.
The Court's new loss of consortium rule is that, under "certain circumstances," a parent's loss from the death or injury of their adult child, "may be of such quality" to warrant recovery, which must be proven by "significant evidence" of an "extraordinarily close and interdependent relationship." The Court then charges the district courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether, as a matter of law, such significant evidence can be found. I submit that such a rule places courts in the unenviable position of having to distinguish between those parent-child relationships which are, as a matter of law, close and loving, and those which are not, as if such a task was humanly possible. This is a rule without parameters.
The Court's decision is well-meaning. However, the policy behind the limitation of consortium claims to losses involving minor children was well-premised upon the obligations of the parent-minor child relationship that the law specifically recognizes, and which do not exist in parent-adult child relationships. A majority of jurisdictions has recognized this. Today, we trade the certainty of that well-premised policy for one which is premised upon utter uncertainty-the sufficiency of the loving relationship. In the long run, that choice is a poor one.
I dissent.
JIM RICE
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